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Why, then, is the social value of privacy so isolated from the policy 
debate around data protection? 1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Social conceptions of privacy are a family of theories united by 
similar definitions of privacy, common estimations of its value and 
similar guidelines for policy. These three elements of definition, 
evaluation and policy prescription are also present in the more 
familiar conceptions of privacy as an individual right and as 
protection against harm. But in a social conception of privacy the 
collective, communal, group nature of privacy is primary in all three 
elements. 
A social theory of privacy sounds like an oxymoron. Isn’t privacy 
essentially about keeping other people out? At a very abstract level, 
privacy does exclude people; it does stop the flow of information to 
others. But a key element of a social conception of privacy is the 
notion that privacy does not stop the flow of information to everyone. 
Instead, privacy enables the flow of information to some, but not to 
others. A further key element of the social conceptions of privacy is 
the idea that the people to whom the information is allowed to flow 
 
 
 
 
1 Valerie Steeves, Reclaiming the Social Value of Privacy, in LESSONS FROM THE IDENTITY 
TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 199 (Ian R. Kerr, 
Valerie M. Steeves & Carole Lucock eds., 2009). 
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are determined by their social role.2 This is a critical way in which a 
social theory of privacy differs from the familiar individual right to 
control information flows, which leaves information disclosure up to 
the preferences of individuals. In a social theory of privacy, 
information flows are governed by widespread social norms. 
In a social theory of privacy, the value of privacy also has an 
essential social dimension. In other frameworks, privacy benefits 
individuals – it vindicates rights that they have as human beings 
regardless of social structure or it protects people against certain 
economic harms. But in a social conception, privacy functions as an 
element of social structure; it maintains certain widely accepted and 
beneficial social practices and institutions such as law, medicine, 
education, democratic political governance, and religion. In this way, 
privacy’s value is intrinsically tied to the importance and urgency of 
these social practices. 
Finally, a social theory of privacy should contain elements of 
policy guidance. Here, however, social theories have been less 
successful. Privacy as a human right draws on the well-developed 
rhetoric and style of argumentation of the international human rights 
movement. It plausibly contrasts the fundamental nature of privacy as 
upholding the dignity and autonomy of individuals with the merely 
economic or utilitarian considerations that might justify use of private 
information. Privacy as harm prevention plausibly draws on the 
utilitarian tradition of assessing the costs and benefits of privacy 
protections versus their economic costs.  
A social theory of privacy cannot draw on these familiar policy 
frameworks. For that reason, until recently it has been largely 
neglected in policy circles. In the last few years, however, the Federal 
Trade Commission,3 the Obama Administration,4 the new EU General 
 
 
 
 
2 See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 174 (2007). 
3 The Federal Trade Commission’s March 2012 report recommends that for practices 
inconsistent with the context of their interaction with consumers, companies should give 
consumers choice, but that companies do not need to provide choice before collecting and 
using consumers’ data for commonly accepted practices. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING 
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 36, 48 (2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-
report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-
recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/99JE-FBXF].  
4 The Obama Administration’s consumer privacy report recommended a consumer privacy 
bill of rights containing a principle calling for “Respect for Context: Consumers have a right 
to expect that companies will collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are 
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Data Protection Regulation,5 and the Federal Communications 
Commission’s proposed privacy rules for broadband providers6 all 
have a key role for consistency with context. As Nissenbaum has 
remarked, however, this effort crucially distorts and reduces the social 
element in her theory, by reinterpreting the key social category of 
“context” as either “technology” or “business sector.”7 
One purpose of this paper is to show that a social conception of 
privacy can generate actionable policy guidelines. It does this by 
constructing a notion of harm to social contexts, and by showing how 
some privacy rules prevent harm to social contexts. The policy 
recommendation is that policymakers should assess the extent to 
which an information practice harms social contexts in determining 
whether and how to regulate. 
                                                                                                                   
consistent with the context in which consumers provide the data.” WHITE HOUSE, 
CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING 
PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 15 (2012), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MS4K-DBQV]. 
5 The new General Data Protection Regulation for the European Union calls for 
“consideration of context in which personal data have been collected” in determining 
whether further use of information is compatible with the purpose for which the data were 
originally collected. General Data Protection Regulation, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 37, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2016:119:FULL&from=EN 
[https://perma.cc/ENB6-HFWK]. 
6 The Federal Communications Commission’s proposal for broadband privacy calls for opt-
out consent for marketing communications-related services, but opt-in consent for other 
uses because they think that this approach is “consistent with consumer expectations” and 
observes the regulatory best practice that “consumer choice turns on the extent to which 
the practice is consistent with the context of the transaction.” Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 31 FCC Rcd. 2,500, 2,543 (2016), 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db0401/FCC-16-39A1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MKJ5-JM4P]. The FCC’s final broadband privacy rule called for opt-in 
consent for “sensitive information” because this framework “better reflects consumer 
expectations.”  See In the Matter of Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and 
Other Telecommunications Services, 81 Fed. Reg. 87,274 (Dec. 2, 2016), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-148A1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JJ7N-VAG2]. In March 2017, Congress repealed the broadband privacy 
rules indicating a change of direction under the new Trump Administration. See Cecilia 
Kang, Congress Moves to Overturn Obama-Era Online Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/technology/congress-votes-to-
overturn-obama-era-online-privacy-rules.html [https://perma.cc/GEZ4-7W98].  
7 Helen Nissenbaum, Respect for Context as a Benchmark for Privacy Online: What it is 
and What it isn’t, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 278 
(Beate Roessler & Dorota Mokrosinska eds., 2015). 
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Harm to a social context occurs when people withdraw from the 
context in order to protect themselves. This can take place, for 
instance, when people do not go to a doctor, lawyer, or priest or do not 
disclose information fully in order to avoid having the information 
divulged in other contexts and used against them. Of course, the harm 
from this less than full engagement with a social practice affects 
individual people, because people do not get the care and counseling 
they need. But that is not what I want to focus on. Isolated examples 
of avoidance of service practitioners suggest an idiosyncratic 
individual issue, not a social problem. But when avoidance is rational 
and widespread, the damage is social. When people generally—and 
with good reason—avoid doctors, lawyers, and priests, the practices of 
medical care, legal counseling, and religious worship do not perform 
the social role we expect of them.  
So, harm to a social context is tied to the rational self-protective 
behavior of individuals to insulate themselves from adverse 
consequences of information uses in other contexts. This notion of 
harm to contexts allows a style of argumentation that justifies a 
substantial restriction on information flows, not on the basis of 
individual harm or the assertion of fundamental human rights, but on 
the harm that is done to a social practice. Contextual harm provides a 
social basis for certain restrictions on the secondary use of 
information.8 
This style of argumentation goes back at least to Bentham who 
favored the confidentiality of the Catholic confession. He argued that 
when information disclosed in confession is allowed to be disclosed in 
court proceedings, it has the “natural effect . . . of preventing the 
practice”9 of penance. It operates as a “prohibition on all such 
confessions for the spiritual purpose . . .”10 
When contexts are harmed, the harm is not purely personal. The 
loss is not just financial, physical or psychological harm to specific 
 
 
 
 
8 Scholars and policymakers have attempted to distinguish permissible from impermissible 
secondary uses in terms of preventing harms to individuals, protecting their fundamental 
rights to control over information use, and respecting their reasonable expectations of how 
information collected by a data controller will be used. I suggest that an additional 
consideration is that a secondary use could be considered impermissible when it creates 
harm to the context in which the information was collected.  
9 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 586, 588 (Hunt & Clarke eds., 
1827).  
10 Id. at 586. 
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people. Instead, the cost is social. In the example of the loss of 
confessional confidentiality, a certain religious practice ceases to exist 
as certainly as if it had been declared illegal.  
In Part II of this paper, I review some of the accounts of privacy 
that treat it as an aspect of social structure. In particular, I look at the 
views of Nissenbaum, Merton, Foucault, Bloustein, Post, Regan, 
Steeves, and Benkler as illustrative examples of this family of privacy 
theories.  
In Part III, I examine the contextual harm basis for several witness 
privileges: priest-penitent, attorney-client, psychotherapist-patient, 
reporter-source, and doctor-patient.  
In Part IV, I discuss the notion of contextual harm and apply it to 
genetic privacy, student privacy, and to privacy in online social 
networks, thereby illustrating the utility of the notion of contextual 
harm in addressing some pressing privacy issues. 
In Part V, I formulate a principle of contextual harm that a privacy 
restriction should be considered whenever an information flow causes 
or is likely to cause significant contextual harm. I contrast this 
principle with familiar privacy principles such as purpose specification 
and respect for context. I also seek to understand how to resolve 
cross-contextual conflicts where gains in one context mean losses in 
others, an ever-more urgent task in light of big data’s capacity to 
aggregate and decontextualize information. Part VI is a short 
conclusion and summary. 
While the principle of contextual harm is useful in providing a 
basis for many privacy restrictions, it is not complete. An information 
flow that causes no contextual harm might still be objectionable. 
Other normative bases for privacy restrictions, drawn from the 
considerations of human rights and utilitarianism, will need to be 
invoked for a full privacy theory.  
The paper makes several contributions toward vindicating social 
conceptions of privacy as useful for understanding and guiding 
privacy policy: 
? To survey a variety of social conceptions of privacy 
? To add to these social conceptions by formulating a 
notion of harm to social contexts 
? To show how familiar privacy restrictions have a 
basis in this notion of contextual harm 
? To encourage the greater use of assessments of 
contextual harm in evaluating new information 
uses 
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II. PRIVACY AS AN ELEMENT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
A. Traditional Privacy Frameworks 
One way to think about privacy is as a fundamental human right. 
In this rights-based way of thinking, privacy embodies aspects of 
human dignity. Respecting privacy is a way to affirm the value of 
individual autonomy and independence from the intrusions of state 
and society.11 The traditional fair information practices implement this 
human rights-based approach to privacy.12  
Lending support to this approach is the fact that privacy rights are 
established in various instruments of international and European 
human rights law.13 In accordance with these international and 
European legal instruments, the European Data Protection Directive 
from 1995 implements this fundamental human right to privacy.14 The 
 
 
 
 
11 EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, PRIVACY AS AN ASPECT OF HUMAN DIGNITY, reprinted in EDWARD 
J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 1-47 (2d ed. 1978). 
12 See ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY (2016), 
http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/692V-SZEW]. For 
a complete list of fair information practices, see MEMORANDUM FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY POLICY GUIDANCE ON THE FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE 
PRINCIPLES: FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY POLICY AT THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY (2008), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_policyguide_2008-01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BR93-25S2].  
13 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, at art. 12, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948), http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ [https://perma.cc/G8CR-3BAQ]; G.A. 
Res. 2200A (XXI), at art.17, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Mar. 23, 
1976), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/ccpr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4QXN-UWK2]; European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(1) (Sept. 
3, 1953), 87 U.N.T.S. 103, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q9Q8-PGC3]; Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 
16, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN [https://perma.cc/PGQ8-
S76N]; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7, 8, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 
1, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0389:0403:en:PDF 
[https://perma.cc/DAA8-MARK]. 
14 Under Article 1(1) of the Directive, the objective of the Directive is the protection of "the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy 
with respect to the processing of personal data." Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 1(1), 1995 
O.J. (L 281) 31, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=en [https://perma.cc/5NBL-
5A6D] (on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data). 
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new General Data Protection Regulation continues this objective of 
protecting the fundamental right to privacy.15 
A second way of thinking about privacy is as the prevention of 
harm. A number of privacy scholars and practitioners have developed 
this harm framework including Posner,16 Beales and Muris,17 
MacCarthy,18 Wittes,19 and Cate.20 They all share the idea that privacy 
policy should focus on the prevention of specific, tangible harm to 
individuals and classes of individuals. The harm framework derives 
from the utilitarian tradition that sees utility or welfare as the major 
guide to public policy.  
Privacy as the prevention of harm relies on a notion of harm. The 
conceptual resources needed to flesh out this notion of harm are 
already present in the Federal Trade Commission’s notion of 
unfairness. It suggests thinking of an act or practice as harmful when 
“the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or to competition.”21 
This test has concentrates on aggregated harm to individuals, and 
suggests at least a qualitative cost-benefit test. It allows small 
individual level harms to be aggregated into a large quantitative harm. 
It is probabilistic and allows a substantial risk of harm to count as 
harmful. And it recognizes that every act or practice has the potential 
 
 
 
 
15 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 5.  
16 See Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978).  
17 See J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting 
Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (2008).  
18 See Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and 
Externalities, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 425 (2011).  
19 See BENJAMIN WITTES, BROOKINGS INSTIT., DATABUSE: DIGITAL PRIVACY AND THE MOSAIC 
(Apr. 1, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/research/databuse-digital-privacy-and-the-
mosaic/ [https://perma.cc/8WTZ-9T8J]. 
20 Fred Cate, Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN 
THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 343 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156972 [https://perma.cc/FVZ5-
XMT6]. 
21 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006). 
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for positive consequences that need to be weighed before a judgment 
is made that the act or practice is harmful.22 
B. Introduction to Privacy as an Element of Social Structure 
In contrast to these traditional approaches, there is a family of 
theories that treat privacy as an element of social structure. This social 
conception of privacy is not meant to replace the familiar rights-based 
approach and the harm framework, but to supplement these 
traditional approaches and to draw attention to an important and 
sometimes neglected aspect of privacy, namely, its role in constituting 
and implementing group purposes, values and objectives.  
A crucial part of this approach is the recognition that in many 
cases, public policy or law does not create privacy; it is often a pre-
existing creature of social life and its requirements can be supported 
or suppressed by public policy and law. Privacy norms limit the 
observability of people when they are engaged in specific social 
practices; these norms exist in order to allow these social practices to 
flourish and derive a part of their justification from playing this social 
role.  
Sometimes transparency of social practices is to the good, but 
often it is destructive of the goals, purposes and ends of the social 
practice in question. Privacy norms function to cloak social practices 
in those cases where observation would have harmful effects on the 
social practice itself. 
This social conception of privacy is in sharp contrast to the 
individualist conception that rights-based theories and utilitarian 
theories share. In thinking of privacy as a human right, the idea is that 
privacy protects individuals from intrusions by society and state. It is 
a keep-out sign whereby individual autonomy and dignity can be 
preserved even against the demands of the welfare of society as a 
whole. For utilitarians, privacy is a personal preference that varies 
randomly in society. Some people are willing to share; others are not; 
still others will share depending on the purposes. It is a matter of 
individual taste.  
The social conception of privacy brings privacy into the world of 
everyday life by thinking of it as vindicating social practices; it is not a 
way to withdraw from society, but a social norm that allows people to 
communicate and interact to perform their needed tasks in society. 
 
 
 
 
22 For a further discussion of this notion of harm, see MacCarthy, supra note 18.  
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Rather than serve as an obstacle to the achievement of public purpose 
or as a random idiosyncratic matter of individual taste, privacy 
performs essential social functions.23 
An important concept in thinking of privacy as an element of 
social structure is the notion of a social norm. A social norm is a rule 
of conduct that governs the way people interact with each other in 
various parts of social life. The function of norms is to resolve 
problems of social interaction. They do this in several ways:  
? imposing “a significant social pressure for 
conformity and against deviation;”24 
? instilling a “belief by the people concerned in their 
indispensability for the proper functioning of 
society;”25  
? by privileging norms in the common and expected 
clashes between the dictates of norms “on the one 
hand and personal interests and desires on the 
other.”26 
Theories of privacy as an element of social structure share 
the idea that privacy norms function in much the same way as 
all norms do to resolve problems of social interaction.  
C. Nissenbaum 
Nissenbaum’s contextualist theory of privacy arises out of a 
communitarian approach to ethics and political philosophy. This style 
of moral theory privileges tradition, socially determined virtues and 
social norms as the basis of morality. Many communitarians are 
hostile to privacy since they view it as an attempt to impose 
individualistic rights against the common values of the community or 
 
 
 
 
23 FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM 8 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
1992) (privacy “facilitates association with people, not independence from people.”).  
24 Cass Sunstein, Where do Norms Come From? A Review of The Emergence of Norms by 
Edna Ullmann-Margalit, THE NEW RAMBLER (1978), http://newramblerreview.com/book-
reviews/philosophy/the-emergence-of-norms [https://perma.cc/6MFU-G8HR]. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
2017] MACCARTHY 409 
 
 
to block the use of shaming and other techniques of social control to 
maintain public values and morals.27  
Nissenbaum turns this communitarian idea on its head and 
sketches a view of privacy as informational norms whose widespread 
acceptance is essential to the integrity of different social contexts. 
Socio-technical systems that dissolve embedded context-relative social 
norms of information flows are seen as problematic. One function of 
privacy policy is to provide the legal resources for defending the 
integrity of social contexts against the tendency of new technological 
possibilities to undermine information norms that are essential to 
these social contexts.  
This social conception of privacy does not articulate and defend a 
set of abstract principles that can be used universally to assess 
information flows. Privacy is not an autonomous legal or 
philosophical enterprise. It is embedded in the daily life and activity of 
people engaged in social pursuits. When a new socio-technical 
practice arises that changes information flows, the key assessment 
that needs to be made is not whether the new practice violates an 
abstract pre-defined right to privacy or whether it advances an 
abstract notion of human welfare, but whether the new practice is 
consistent with the ends, goals, and purposes of the context in which it 
is used. Privacy controversies arise when the new practice violates an 
entrenched social norm of information flow and adversely affects the 
ends, goals and purposes of the context in which it arises. 
Nissenbaum’s key idea is that privacy is a right to an appropriate 
flow of information, where appropriate is defined by the social context 
in which the information is generated, disclosed and used.28 She 
develops the notion of a social context in sufficient detail so that it can 
be applied to a wide range of phenomenon.   
This allows her to define contextual integrity as that which is 
preserved when informational norms are respected and that which is 
violated when informational norms are breached.29 She notes, “[t]here 
is a strong kinship between contextual integrity and the concept of 
 
 
 
 
27 See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999). 
28 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 127 (2009) (the key insight of her view is that 
privacy is not defined by the notions of secrecy or control, but by the notion of context-
dependent informational norms).  
29 Id. at 140. 
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reasonable expectations.”30 Indeed, it is a concept “rooted in 
convention, habit and custom.”31 
In this view, privacy is essentially related to entrenched 
transmission norms involving personal information. These 
transmission norms impose constraints on the flow of information by 
setting out the terms and conditions under which transfers of 
information ought or ought not to take place.32 
For instance, the transmission principles under which information 
is transmitted in the context of an exchange between close friends are 
different than the transmission principles in a medical context. 
Intimate sharing of intimate details of personal life are expected to be 
mutual in the context of friendship, but would be totally out of place in 
a medical context.33 
This approach is enormously appealing. It provides an intuitive 
and comprehensive way to think about and analyze privacy issues. Its 
great strength is in understanding why improper disseminations or 
uses of information produce the sense of outrage they do. People 
understand why violations of entrenched norms of behavior can 
produce widespread hostile reactions. Bringing this insight to bear on 
privacy issues illuminates many of the puzzles that have concerned 
privacy advocates, analysts, scholars and policy makers. People have 
such strong reactions against privacy intrusions, not because of their 
subjective views and idiosyncratic preferences about information 
flows, but because privacy intrusions work against widely accepted, 
well understood, entrenched social norms. 
D. Merton 
Robert Merton provides an account of privacy as an element of 
social structure.34 The key idea is that privacy plays an essential social 
function: 
 
 
 
 
30 Id. at 162. 
31 Id. at 165. 
32 Id. at 145. 
33 Id. 
34 ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 395-433 (1968).  
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What is sometimes called ‘the need for privacy’ – that 
is, insulation of actions and thoughts from surveillance 
by others – is the individual counterpart to the 
functional requirement of social structure that some 
measure of exemption from full observability be 
provided for . . . “Privacy” is not merely a personal 
predilection; it is an important functional requirement 
for the effective operation of social structure.35 
The important insight is that privacy is not simply a personal 
preference people happen to have. Nor is it a result of accidental 
developments in history or culture. Rather, for various social 
structures there is a functionally optimal degree of visibility. 36 
Privacy, “insulation of actions and thoughts from surveillance by 
others,” improves the operation of social structure by varying the level 
of observability depending on the needs of the social structure itself, 
not on the personal preferences or needs of individuals. Privacy needs 
of individuals do not explain social norms of privacy. Rather the 
causation runs the other way: “resistance to full visibility of one’s 
behavior appears . . . to result from structural properties of group 
life.”37 
In particular, role-expectations of social life need to provide some 
leeway for individual differences and circumstances, since role 
definitions cannot be specified to cover all possible personality types 
and situations. In this way, the “antipathy toward having one’s every 
activity subject to observation” allows for individual variation in 
performing group roles.  
Privacy norms allow sufficient flexibility for individual differences 
and give social space for tolerated evasions of norms. In addition, a 
restriction on the flow of information out of the social context in 
which it is created allows needed communication to take place within 
the context. For instance, the social norm that communications in 
classrooms are privileged maintains “a degree of autonomy for the 
 
 
 
 
35 Id. at 429. 
36 “[W]e are led to the idea that differing social structures require, for their effective 
operation, differing degrees of visibility. Correlatively it is being suggested that differing 
social structures require arrangements for insulation from full and uninhibited visibility if 
they are to function adequately: arrangements which, in the vernacular, are described as 
needs for privacy, or as the importance of secrecy . . .” Id. at 398. 
37 Id. at 397. 
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teacher.” 38 Confidentiality rules in law, medicine, teaching and the 
ministry have “the same function of insulating clients from ready 
observability of their behavior and beliefs . . .”39 
Merton’s sociological functionalism that focuses on privacy as an 
element of social structure provides a rich and promising framework 
for thinking about issues of privacy policy and law. 
E. Foucault 
Foucault’s work on the social effects of constant surveillance 
provides another way of examining the social role played by privacy.40 
His major contribution to privacy theory is his analysis of the 
behavioral and attitudinal effects of Bentham’s prison reform proposal 
of a “Panopticon.” But behind that analysis is an implied social role of 
privacy as a way to protect individuals and groups from external social 
control by modern and contemporary “disciplinary” institutions.  
The social institution Foucault analyzes is a “Panopticon.” The key 
element of such an institution is to: 
. . . place a supervisor in a central tower and . . . shut up 
in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a 
worker or a schoolboy . . . . the cells of the periphery . . . 
are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in 
which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and 
constantly visible. He is seen, but he does not see; he is 
the object of information, never a subject in 
communication . . . in the peripheric ring, one is totally 
seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees 
everything without ever being seen.41 
This physical arrangement has a social purpose. In addition to 
saving on the number of guards and other supervisory personnel, the 
ability of a single overseer to keep track of numerous individualized 
 
 
 
 
38 Id. at 429. See also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (upholding the 
autonomy of the teacher in the classroom). 
39 MERTON, supra note 34, at 429. 
40 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195 (Alan Sheridan 
trans., 1977).  
41 Id. 
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inhabitants of the institution allows the rules and norms of the 
institution to fully penetrate minds of the inmates and guide their 
behavior without the need for explicit coercion.  
Foucault’s concern is with “disciplinary power from the beginning 
of the nineteenth century in the psychiatric asylum, the penitentiary, 
the reformatory, the approved school and, to some extent, the 
hospital.”42 The lack of privacy, the full observability of all aspects a 
person’s behavior and conduct, “constant surveillance” is essential to 
this disciplinary power. 
One aspect of this control is the way in which other social 
relationships are abolished. No social practice, group or context 
stands between the isolated individual and the controlling disciplinary 
institution. The group has been broken into isolated atomic parts; the 
collective effect of social exchanges “. . . is abolished and replaced by a 
collection of separated individualities.”43 Foucault sees that privacy 
has the social role of allowing the formation and maintenance of social 
relationships that will act as intermediary, protective institutions 
shielding thought and attitude from controlling visibility. 
Foucault emphasizes this connection between individualized 
visibility and power by noting “the major effect of the Panopticon . . . 
(is) . . . to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent 
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.”44 Visibility 
itself controls behavior, for “. . . it is not necessary to use force to 
constrain the convict to good behaviour, the madman to calm, the 
worker to work, the schoolboy to application, the patient to the 
observation of the regulations.”45 
Why? Because the person “who is subjected to a field of visibility, 
and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; 
he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in 
himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both 
roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.”46 
Constant surveillance provides for “the basic functioning of a 
society penetrated through and through with disciplinary 
 
 
 
 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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mechanisms.”47 Surveillance is “a functional mechanism that must 
improve the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more 
effective, a design of subtle coercion.”48 
Many privacy theorists have used Foucault’s insights on the effects 
of observability to critique contemporary society. Oscar Gandy warned 
of the dangers of a society in which people were continuously 
organized and reorganized into different statistical categories for the 
purpose of marketing and business decisions.49 The philosopher 
Jeffrey Reiman identified four risks from a modern version of a 
panopticon, all of which are threats to the free exercise of individual 
autonomy.50 In Julie Cohen’s view in a panopticon without privacy 
protection there is no zone for autonomous self-development, and the 
beliefs, desires and attitudes of individuals under constant 
surveillance are more likely to track the mainstream and expected.51 
Paul Ohm has warned of the dangers of a panopticon he calls a “data 
base of ruin, a complete accounting of a person’s life which would 
provide an adversary with sufficient information to discredit him or 
her and significantly degrade his or her life prospects.”52  
All four thinkers focus on how the disciplinary function of 
observability can harm individuals. Observation can be mistaken and 
discriminatory, it can limit individual freedom and autonomy and it 
can expose us to tangible personal harm. But this focus on individual 
harm misses the key insight of Foucault’s analysis: by stripping people 
down into nothing but isolated individuals the mechanism of 
observability displaces intermediate social practices, prevents people 
from engaging in them, and so allows the substitution of the norms of 
disciplinary institutions for the norms of group practice. 
 
 
 
 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 OSCAR GANDY, THE PANOPTIC SORT 200-01 (Herbert I. Schiller ed., 1993). 
50 Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks 
to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 34 (1995). 
51 JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF 
EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012). 
52 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010). 
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The key point is that the presence or lack of privacy has social 
implications. The absence of privacy protections functions to reinforce 
certain mechanisms of social control; the presence of these 
protections functions to create a society in which power is less 
centralized and dispersed and in which social practices themselves can 
provide an insulation against external social control. 
F. Bloustein 
Bloustein sets out a social theory of privacy in his exploration of 
the notion of group privacy as the “right to huddle.”53 In his view, 
group privacy contrasts with the familiar individual right to be left 
alone: “The right to be left alone protects the integrity and the dignity 
of the individual. The right to associate with others in confidence . . . 
assures the success and integrity of the group purpose.”54 
Bloustein recognizes the role of group privacy as an essential 
element of social structure that varies with the nature and purpose of 
different groups,55 and “covers the large, formal organization, as well 
as the relatively informal relationship, and the whole range of 
intermediate variations in size, duration, and formality.”56 
Bloustein notes that law does not create group privacy practices. 
They have a history, tradition and basis in social practice that 
precedes any legal recognition and they persist through a variety of 
non-legal mechanisms.57 We will see how the law reinforces social 
privacy norms in the next section on witness privileges.  
 
 
 
 
53 EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, GROUP PRIVACY: THE RIGHT TO HUDDLE, reprinted in EDWARD J. 
BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 123-186 (2d ed. 1978).  
54 Id. at 181. 
55 “Confidentiality of communication in one’s associations serves different purposes 
depending on the nature of the association . . . what they have in common is that, in each 
confidentiality serves to assure the success and preserve the integrity of the association.” 
Id. at 181. 
56 Id. at 126. 
57 “[M]ost confidences are maintained without any reference to law at all. Among other 
factors, a sense of good faith, the fear of reprisal or loss of face, traditional practice, 
religious or ethical compunctions and intricacies of bureaucratic or organizational 
structure are important to the support of a system of confidences. Law acts as only one 
influence among many.” Id. at 127. 
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G. Post 
Robert Post develops a rich social theory of privacy in his analysis 
of various privacy torts.58 His key idea is that the privacy tort 
“safeguards rules of civility that in some significant measure 
constitute both individuals and community.”59 
For Post the privacy tort of intrusion rests on a showing that the 
intrusion would be “offensive to any person of ordinary sensibilities” 
or “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. ”60 According to 
Post, the privacy tort builds upon a pre-existing social norm and finds 
a basis for compensation in the fact that the norm has been violated, 
regardless of the actual specific mental suffering of the plaintiff. The 
tort “. . . rests on the premise that the integrity of individual 
personality is dependent upon the observance of certain kinds of 
social norms.”61 
Post argues that these social norms are themselves constitutive of 
human personalities. To be a person is to be deserving of certain 
patterns of deference and demeanor, Post argues, quoting sociologist 
Erving Goffman.62 To violate those patterns is not to do a person 
physical damage, nor is it to inflict a psychological damage specific to 
that person’s personality, attitude, or feelings. People whose privacy 
has been invaded have been denied respect, and consequently their 
status as persons to whom respect is due has been questioned.  
Post calls the privacy rules involved “civility rules” and the 
personality protected by them the “social personality.” These civility 
rules are constitutive of communities. They “give normative shape and 
substance to the society that shares them . . . [they] . . . define the very 
’community’ which the ’reasonable person’ inhabits.”63  
 
 
 
 
58 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common 
Law Tort, CAL. L. REV. (1989), 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1210&context=fss_paper
s [https://perma.cc/2GV6-U8FR]. 
59 Id. at 959. 
60 Id. at 960. 
61 Id. at 963. 
62 Id. at 962-63 (quoting Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, in 
INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR 47, 84-85, 90-91 (1967)). 
63 Id. at 964. 
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These civility rules have their life independently of law. Indeed, 
law can and should recognize only some of them.64 However, the 
social role of privacy, as embodied in privacy torts, is to uphold pre-
legal social norms of civility that “define the substance and boundaries 
of community life.”65 
He laments the loss of the conception of privacy as essential to our 
common life and warns about the futility of trying to find a fully 
adequate theory of privacy in the language of rights and 
utilitarianism:  
And we are thus led to attempt to rationalize the value 
of privacy, to discover its functions and reasons, to 
dress it up in the philosophical language of autonomy, 
or to dress it down in the economic language of 
information costs. But this is to miss the plain fact that 
privacy is for us a living reality only because we enjoy a 
certain kind of communal existence.66 
H. Regan 
In her groundbreaking study of privacy, Priscilla Regan developed 
nuanced social conceptions of privacy.67 For her, privacy has 
important social aspects because it has social value as a common 
value, a public value, and a collective value.68 
Regan views privacy as a “common value” in that it is not an 
idiosyncratic personal belief but a widely shared social norm. This 
conception of privacy as a shared, common value converges with 
Nissenbaum’s view that privacy is a context-dependent entrenched 
social norm. Regan finds evidence that we have shared views on the 
 
 
 
 
64 “For obvious reasons, however, the common law can maintain only a small subset of 
these norms. The law itself claims to enforce only the most important of them, only those 
whose breach would be "highly offensive." Id. at 975.  
65 Id. at 1008. 
66 Id. at 1009. 
67 See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 225-227 (1995). 
68 Priscilla M. Regan, Privacy and the Common Good: Revisited, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF 
PRIVACY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 50 (Beate Roessler & Dorota Mokrosinska, 
eds., 2015). 
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importance of privacy from the widespread negative reactions to 
intrusive government surveillance and information collected through 
social networking sites.69 
Regan argues that privacy is a “public value” in two ways. First, it 
is instrumentally important for protecting free speech rights and from 
a controlling government’s power. Second, the public establishes a 
social sphere where individuals can engage in political discourse about 
controversial issues of collective importance. This is done as part of a 
civic commitment to the common good – without seeking to advance 
their own social or economic interests. 
Finally, Regan argues that privacy has an economic “collective 
value.” Privacy is an economic good that could, in principle, be bought 
and sold in the marketplace, but for a variety of reasons, the 
marketplace will not produce a socially optimal amount of the good. 70 
I. Steeves 
Steeves seeks to recover the social value of privacy, which she 
states has been missing from both theoretical discussions and policy 
practice. Steeves reacts strongly against the definition of privacy as 
purely the individual’s right to control information about oneself that 
derives from Alan Westin’s pioneering work. In a comprehensive 
survey that covers Mead, Altman and Westin, Steeves extracts a 
number of insights concerning the function that privacy plays in social 
relationships.71  
One of the most important functions is to create socially necessary 
boundaries between the different social roles we play:  
. . . privacy . . . allows us to perform one role—as wife or 
mother—separate and apart from other roles—as 
teacher or policy maker, for example . . . surveillance is 
problematic precisely because it collapses the 
boundaries between roles and makes the individual 
 
 
 
 
69 Id. at 58. 
70 Id. at 62-63.  
71 See, e.g., Valerie Steeves, Reclaiming the Social Value of Privacy, in LESSONS FROM THE 
IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 191-208 (Ian 
R. Kerr, Valerie M. Steeves & Carole Lucock, eds., 2009). 
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accountable for all her actions, independent of the 
context or the role she is playing.72 
Steeves generalized this into a definition of privacy as “the 
boundary between self and other that is negotiated through discursive 
interaction between two or more social actors.”73 Thinking of privacy 
as an element of social interaction would avoid the legalistic emphasis 
on information flows. For example, use of this definition has inhibited 
hospital officials from passing on a patient’s religious affiliation to the 
hospital chaplain without express written consent from the patient.  
J. Benkler 
Benkler relies upon a social theory of group privacy in his 
discussion of the whistleblower’s defense.74 In contrast to Merton and 
Bloustein who view group privacy as performing a valuable social 
function, Benkler thinks of group secrecy as a way for organizations to 
avoid public accountability. His theme is that “. . . secrecy insulates 
self-reinforcing internal organizational dynamics from external 
correction.”75 
Keeping group secrets enables the group not only to achieve its 
purposes, but also to cover up its mistakes. His advocacy for a new 
whistleblowing law takes place against the background of a social 
systems approach to information within organizations. For him 
groups, which he calls, “organizations,” function using norms, which 
he calls “institutions,” to form systems of interaction that have a 
certain independence with respect to the outside world. Norms of 
“secrecy” or “transparency” regulate the level of independence and 
autonomy that these organizations can maintain.76 
 
 
 
 
72 Id. at 205 (Steeves immediately draws the connection between this somewhat abstract 
sociological point about role boundaries and a pressing privacy policy issue, namely, a 
“society in which Facebook pictures are used by employers to decide whether or not to hire 
someone”). 
73 Id. at 206. 
74 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers 
and Whistleblowers, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 281 (2014).  
75 Id. at 285. 
76 Id. at 287-88. 
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Thus, an organization such as an intelligence agency can use 
secrecy “. . . to segment information flows about its structure and 
functions to allow it to project power in other systems and resist their 
incursions.”77 Accountability leaks or acts of whistleblowing perform 
an opposing but valuable system function, namely, correction of 
inevitable systemic mistakes.78 
The fact that Benkler emphasizes the social function of 
transparency rather than group privacy should not fool us into 
thinking that he has no sense of the social function of group privacy. 
He is aware that it has social consequences and plays a role in the 
social life of organizations and systems. His view, however, is that the 
level of visibility in national security organizations is far less than 
Merton’s optimum. Of course, group privacy helps organizations 
achieve group purposes, but too much secrecy means the loss of the 
accountability function that is also a key element in social structure.  
III. THE ROLE OF WITNESS PRIVILEGES IN PRESERVING PRIVACY 
NORMS 
So far, we have reviewed different ways in which privacy can be 
thought of as an element of social structure. We are now able to 
examine how law and public policy should treat privacy norms that 
function to protect the integrity of social contexts using the example of 
witness privileges. 
In general, law does not disturb social norms. It neither requires 
obedience to social norms, nor forbids it. In the case of confidentiality 
norms, “. . . the law rarely requires people to break their confidences 
with one another; indeed, the law protects and favors confidences in 
most circumstances.”79 
Sometimes, however, confidentiality norms come into conflict 
with the normative requirements of other parts of a social system. 
This is often the case with conflicts between norms of confidentiality 
and the requirements of the legal system to get at the truth of a matter 
in order to dispense justice. To get our bearings, we start with 
Bentham’s famous defense of the privacy of the confessional. 
 
 
 
 
77 Id. at 288. 
78 Id. at 289. 
79 BLOUSTEIN, supra note 53, at 136. 
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A. Bentham and the Confidentiality of the Confessional80 
It is well known that Bentham did not believe in the attorney client 
privilege. He thought it provided a cloak that could only hide villainy 
and he thought that lawyers should be required to testify about 
matters communicated to them in confidence by their clients.81 
Bentham reached an entirely different conclusion in the case of the 
confidentiality of the confessional. The argument for forcing priests to 
disclose the contents of confessions is that it would increase the 
evidence available in court. But would it over the long term?  
Bentham’s argument is this: once it is known that Catholic priests 
must disclose the contents of confessions in court proceedings, 
Catholics will stop disclosing in confession anything that could be 
used against them in court, effectively ending the practice of 
confession. But this accomplishes no worthwhile purpose, since after 
an adjustment period there would be no increase in court evidence. 
The only increase in evidence available in court would come during a 
transition period, when people learn to adjust to the new reality, by 
avoiding full disclosure in the confessional.82 
So, there is nothing to be gained in the long run from allowing 
confessional evidence to be used in court proceedings. On the negative 
side, Bentham argues, allowing confessional evidence in court is 
equivalent to banning the practice of confession and so would be 
 
 
 
 
80 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 586, 588 (Hunt & Clarke eds., 
1827). 
81 See RONALD GOLDFARB, IN CONFIDENCE: WHEN TO PROTECT SECRECY AND WHEN TO 
REQUIRE DISCLOSURE 59 (2009). 
82 “Suppose it is an established, and thence a known rule of procedure, that a catholic priest 
is not exempted from the obligation of disclosing . . . statements made to him . . . by a . . . 
penitent . . . in the character of self-prejudicing (including self-incriminating) evidence . . . 
in or for the use of a court of justice . . . What would be the consequence? – That, of that 
quantity of confessorial evidence which is now delivered in secret for a purpose purely 
religious, a certain proportion (it is impossible to say what, but probably a very 
considerable one) would not be so delivered: would be kept back, under the apprehension 
of its being made use of for a judicial purpose. The rule would operate as a prohibition 
upon all such confessions for the spiritual purpose, as would be applicable to the temporal 
purpose: and the penalty would be, whatever consequence of a penal or otherwise 
burthensome nature might be expected to flow from the decision which such testimony 
would warrant, and would therefore be calculated to draw forth.” BENTHAM, supra note 80, 
at 587. 
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inconsistent with freedom of religion, putting an intolerable burden 
on penitent and confessor alike.83 
In effect, Bentham says, the rule allowing confessor evidence 
would threaten the institution of the confession and “. . . this 
institution is an essential feature of the catholic religion, and . . . the 
catholic religion is not to be suppressed by force.”84 
For the purpose of analyzing contextual harm, it is important to 
keep this example and style of argumentation before us as a paradigm 
case and to keep as a theme the idea that allowing information out of a 
context for a different purpose can harm the social practices 
characteristic of that context  
B. Witness Privileges in General 
We now turn to the consideration of witness privileges under U.S. 
law. Witness privileges are exceptions to the general rule that all 
citizens have an obligation to contribute to the search for truth in 
court proceedings. The general obligation to tell what one knows is 
straightforward: If people know something that can help advance a 
plaintiff’s or defendant’s cause or to convict or acquit defendants in a 
criminal trial, they should be required to produce that information in 
open court so that justice can be served.85 In general, pledges of 
 
 
 
 
83 “[W]ith any idea of toleration, a coercion of this nature is altogether inconsistent and 
incompatible. In the character of penitents, the people would be pressed with the whole 
weight of the penal branch of the law; inhibited from the exercise of this essential and 
indispensable article of their religion; prohibited, on pain of death, from the confession of 
all such misdeeds as, if judicially disclosed, would have the effect of drawing down upon 
them that punishment; and so, in the case of inferior misdeeds, combated by inferior 
punishments . . . To confessors, the consequences would be at least equally oppressive. To 
them it would be a downright persecution . . . it would be an order to violate what is by 
them numbered amongst the most sacred of religious duties.” Id. at 588. 
84 Id. at 590. 
85 “For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that 
the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence. When we come to examine the various 
claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to 
give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are 
distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule.” Jaffee v. 
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (citations omitted).  
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secrecy are insufficient to withhold information in court 
proceedings.86 
Despite this general rule in favor of full disclosure in court 
proceedings, U.S. law recognizes a series of witness privileges. A 
uniform code of rules of evidence containing nine specific witness 
privileges was first proposed in 1972, but it never became law.87 
Instead, in 1975 Congress passed a general rule of privilege under Rule 
501, providing that the common law as interpreted on a case-by-case 
basis “in the light of reason and experience” is the touchstone for 
witness privileges.88 
The Supreme Court constructed a test that calls for granting a 
witness privilege when the privilege serves “significant public and 
private interests” and the “likely evidentiary benefit that would result 
from the denial of the privilege is modest.”89 The public served by 
 
 
 
 
86 “[N]o pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail against demand for the truth in a 
court of justice.” GOLDFARB, supra note 81, at 19 (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A 
TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (1905)). 
87 In 1972, the Supreme Court approved a uniform code of rules of evidence to be used in 
federal court and transmitted these rules to Congress. See 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). An 
Advisory Committee appointed by the Court drafted the rules over a period of seven years 
and the Judicial Conference approved them. See Paul Rothstein, The Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 125, 125 (1973); see also 
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980); Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8 n.7. The code 
contained nine specific rules relating to the privilege of certain witnesses to refrain from 
testifying in court proceedings including and limited to: a privilege for those reports 
required under state or federal statute, when that statute grants a privilege; a lawyer-client 
communications privilege (Rule 503); a psychotherapist-patient communications privilege 
(Rule 504); a privilege of an accused to prevent his spouse from testifying against him in a 
criminal proceeding (Rule 505); a privilege covering communications to clergymen (Rule 
506); a privilege to refuse to disclose the tenor of one's lawful vote (Rule 507); a trade 
secrets privilege (Rule 508); and a privilege covering secrets of state and other official 
information and a privilege covering the identity of an informer (Rule 510). This list of 
privileges was exclusive; additional privileges could be recognized by Federal courts only if 
required by the Constitution, a further act of Congress, or new evidence rules adopted by 
the Supreme Court. See FED. R. EVID. 501–513 (proposed); 56 F.R.D. 230–261. These nine 
privilege rules leave out a general physician-patient privilege, a spousal communications 
privilege, and a journalist's privilege. See Rothstein, supra note 87, at 129. 
88 “The common law — as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and 
experience — governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise: 
The United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme 
Court.” FED. R. EVID. 501. The legislative history of the Congressional action adopting Rule 
501 stated that it “should be understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a 
privilege based on a confidential relationship . . . should be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.” S. REP. NO. 93–1277, at 13 (1974). 
89 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11. 
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witness privileges relate to the preservation and fostering of social 
relationships whose proper functioning serves society. Hence, there 
are “privileges between priest and penitent, attorney and client, and 
physician and patient . . . (that) . . . are rooted in the imperative need 
for confidence and trust.”90 Sissela Bok makes a similar point in 
regard to the premise that the witness privilege rests on the “benefits 
of confidentiality to those in need of advice, sanctuary, and aid, and in 
turn to society.”91 
There are potentially other justifications for witness privileges, 
such as preventing “psychological injury to those who shared their 
secrets” and preserving people’s “autonomy and decisional privacy.”92 
However, the key argument is social: what would happen to the social 
practice under consideration (legal practice, religious comfort, 
medical service, or psychological counseling), if the social norm of 
confidentiality inherent in these practices was breached and 
information given in confidence was made available in the very 
different context of court proceedings?  
Respect for context and the need to avoid harm to a social context 
suggests that the law should recognize these privileges. Other 
considerations, however, must be taken into account before a final 
choice is made. Sometimes the issue is framed as the need for a 
 
 
 
 
90 “The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual 
counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts 
and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return. The lawyer-client privilege rests 
on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons 
for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out. Similarly, the 
physician must know all that a patient can articulate in order to identify and to treat 
disease; barriers to full disclosure would impair diagnosis and treatment.” Trammel, 445 
U.S. at 51.  
91 “According to this premise, individuals benefit from such confidentiality because it 
allows them to seek help they might otherwise fear to ask for; those most vulnerable or at 
risk might otherwise not go for help to doctors or lawyers or others trained to provide it. In 
this way, innocent persons might end up convicted of crimes for lack of competent legal 
defense, and disease could take a greater toll among those ashamed of the nature of their 
ailment. Society therefore gains in turn from allowing such professional refuge, the 
argument holds, in spite of the undoubted risks of not learning about certain dangers to the 
community; and everyone is better off when professionals can probe for the secrets that 
will make them more capable of providing the needed help.” SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE 
ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 122 (1989).  
92 GOLDFARB, supra note 81, at 1, 19. 
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balance93 or even a choice between the evil of “betrayal of confidence” 
and the evil of “suppression of truth.”94 
But this idea of balancing the harm to the context against the 
advantages of additional court testimony misstates the real question. 
As Bentham noted in the confessional case, when there really is harm 
to a social context, there is no additional court testimony at all. Once it 
is known that confidential information will be available in court if 
revealed in confidence, it will no longer be revealed in the first place, 
and the quantity of information available in court will be the same as 
if the privilege were granted. The real question is the extent of the risk 
that people will withhold information in specific social contexts in the 
absence of a privilege. Courts are really engaged in a kind of empirical 
risk assessment. They tend to grant the privilege when they think this 
risk is unacceptably high, and they tend to withhold the privilege 
when they think the risk is minimal or tolerable. 
Next, we will consider several of these witness privileges to 
illustrate how the arguments for them rely on the notion of contextual 
harm. The examples are the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the 
attorney-client privilege, the spousal privilege, the journalist’s 
privilege, the doctor-patient privilege, and the protection of genetic 
information. Common themes emerge from this consideration: the 
role of privileges in upholding social practices that further the public 
interest, the reasoning that upholds or rejects the privilege depending 
on the assessment of the risk of harm to the social practice by 
withholding the privilege, and the need for certainty and predictability 
about the contours of the privilege in order to assure its effectiveness.  
 
 
 
 
93 Wigmore, for example, sets out four criteria for a witness privilege: the communication 
must originate in a confidence; the sharing of confidences must be of the essence of the 
relationship; the relationship must be favored by public policy; and the injury which flows 
from the breach of confidence must be more significant to society than the loss of the 
testimony. BLOUSTEIN, supra note 53, at 133 (quoting J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (J. 
McNaughton rev. 1961)) (the last criterion suggests that the injury to a social practice from 
compelled testimony would be compensated for by the greater quantity of truthful 
testimony in court. Bloustein makes a similar balancing point, saying, “in considering 
whether to grant a privilege, the law weighs the harm to the association from compelled 
testimony against the benefit afforded to our system of justice.”).  
94 “[T]he definition of the privilege will express a value choice between protection of 
privacy and discovery of truth and the choice of either involves the acceptance of an evil - 
betrayal of confidence or suppression of truth.” Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., An Historical 
Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1085 (1978). 
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C. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege  
People confide sensitive personal details of their lives to their 
counselors in order to receive professional guidance on their 
emotional lives and on the conduct of their personal relationships. 
The norm of confidentiality of the counselor-client relationship gives 
people the trust they need to disclose intimate information to 
professional counselors in order to receive this professional guidance.  
The legal recognition of this norm as a witness privilege is 
relatively new because the psychotherapeutic context itself is relatively 
new. It wasn’t until the 1950’s that the practice of psychotherapy 
received widespread cultural acceptance. As more and more people 
looked for treatment and expected confidentiality, “powerful cultural 
forces were brought to bear on courts for the protection of this 
expanding form of treatment.” By the mid-1970s, all fifty states had 
passed laws recognizing this privilege.95  
In 1996, the privilege was subject to a Federal court challenge. A 
police officer named Redmond was accused in federal court of 
violating the constitutional rights of a person she killed in the line of 
duty. The police officer’s professional counselor, a licensed social 
worker, refused to hand over her counseling notes as part of court 
evidence in the case. In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the “conversations between Redmond and her therapist and the 
notes taken during their counseling sessions are protected from 
compelled disclosure under Rule 501.”96 The court drew attention to 
the essential role confidentiality played in successful psychotherapy: 
Effective psychotherapy . . . depends upon an 
atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the 
patient is willing to make a frank and complete 
disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. 
Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for 
which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure 
of confidential communications made during 
counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or 
disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of 
 
 
 
 
95 GOLDFARB, supra note 81, at 108. The quotation is from Goldfarb Kindle location 1343; 
the 50 states fact is from Goldfarb Kindle location 1376. 
96 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 2 (1996). 
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disclosure may impede development of the confidential 
relationship necessary for successful treatment.97 
This conclusion was backed by empirical evidence from the 
American Psychological Association showing that absent 
confidentiality “the trust vital to the psychotherapeutic relationship is 
likely to be significantly impaired or destroyed.”98 Some people might 
still take advantage of the services of a psychological counselor, but 
the practice will be more limited and restricted than it otherwise 
would be, and indeed, might not be available for those who need it 
most. 
The Jaffee Court reasoned the psychotherapist privilege “serves 
the public interest” by facilitating mental health of the citizenry, which 
is a public good “of transcendent importance.”99 Moreover, without a 
privilege, no new evidence is likely “to come into being. This unspoken 
‘evidence’ will therefore serve no greater truth-seeking function than if 
it had been spoken and privileged.”100 
Finally, the Jaffee Court rejected a privilege that is subject to ad 
hoc case-by-case balancing, ruling that later evaluations of the need 
for confidentiality by a trial judge “would eviscerate the effectiveness 
of the privilege.”101 
D. Attorney-Client Privilege 
The attorney-client witness privilege protects this confidential 
relationship from court disclosure because without it “clients would 
 
 
 
 
97 Id. at 10.  
98 Brief for the American Psychological Ass’n, as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
14, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). The impairment of the psychotherapeutic 
relationship manifests itself in a number of ways: patients would find it difficult to talk or 
would discontinue therapy if told before the first session that they were not confidential; 
patients would be upset or angry if their confidences were revealed without permission; 
when patients are told that their therapist might be required to disclose their 
communications in court, their willingness to discuss sensitive topics declines markedly; 
fear of disclosure causes some patients to terminate the psychotherapeutic relationship 
threat of public disclosure deters people with emotional problems from seeking needed 
help in the first place. See id. at 14-15. 
99 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11. 
100 Id. at 12. 
101 Id. at 17. 
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not consult attorneys . . . .”102 The attorney-client privilege has long 
been part of the common law, and its existence has not been the 
subject of any serious legal challenge. However, the scope of the 
privilege is defined by two Supreme Court cases. In Upjohn Co. v. 
United States, the Supreme Court clarified that the privilege extended 
to corporate lawyers.103 In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the privilege continued after the death of 
the client.104  
The Upjohn Court noted that the purpose of the privilege “is to 
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their 
clients, and thereby promote broader public interests in the 
observance of law and administration of justice.”105 The assistance of 
skilled attorneys “can only be safely and readily availed of when free 
from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure."106 
The Swidler Court notes that withdrawal of the privilege dos not 
increase the quantity of evidence available in court because without 
the privilege “the client may very well not have made disclosures to his 
attorney at all, so the loss of evidence is more apparent than real.”107 
 
 
 
 
102 GOLDFARB, supra note 81, at 59 (he rejects this utilitarian defense of the privilege as 
“anecdotal, self-serving, and empirically unsupported.”).  
103 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981). 
104 Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 401 (1998). 
105 Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389. In Trammel, the Supreme Court described the rationale 
for the privilege this way, “[t]he lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate 
and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if 
the professional mission is to be carried out.” Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 
(1980). 
106 Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389 (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U. S. 464, 470 (1888)). 
Geoffrey Hazard makes a similar point: “Total abolition would mean that an accused in a 
criminal case could not explain his version of the matter to his lawyer without its being 
transmitted to the prosecution. Defense counsel would become a medium of confession, a 
result that would substantially impair both the accused's right to counsel and the privilege 
against self-incrimination.” Hazard, supra note 94, at 1062. 
107 Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408 (citations omitted). Geoffrey Stone makes a similar 
point about the self-defeating nature of taking away the privilege: “If the client would not 
have disclosed this fact to his lawyer without the assurance of the privilege, then the 
prosecution loses nothing by not being able to learn the information from the lawyer, 
because without the privilege the lawyer wouldn’t have known the information in the first 
place.” Geoffrey Stone, Democracy Demands a Journalist-Source Shield Law, THE DAILY 
BEAST (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/15/democracy-
demands-a-journalist-source-shield-law.html [https://perma.cc/FRY8-PNE5]. 
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Finally, the Upjohn Court noted that the contours of the privilege 
must be predictable, since “[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which 
purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the 
courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”108 The Swidler Court 
agreed and for that reason rejected an after-the-fact balancing test.109 
In summary, the public benefit derived from the attorney-client 
privilege is “the observance of law and administration of justice.” This 
public benefit is obtained only by preserving the integrity of the 
professional relationship between lawyer and client. Preserving this 
relationship does not decrease the flow of evidence to the court 
because without it the disclosure to the attorney would never have 
been made in the first place. Finally, the contours of the privilege must 
be predictable, since an uncertain privilege is little better than no 
privilege at all.  
E. Spousal Privilege 
There are two versions of this privilege. The marital communication 
privilege provides that unwilling spouses cannot be compelled to 
disclose the contents of private communications with each other.  
The other privilege is a bar against spouses testifying against each 
other, even if one of them is willing to provide such testimony.  
1. Marital Communication Privilege 
The Supreme Court in Wolfle allowed a letter between spouses to 
be admitted into evidence because the husband had disclosed it to his 
 
 
 
 
108 Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 393. Even though the extent of the privilege must be 
predictable, there must be some limits on the privilege, “for at minimum it is inadmissible 
that legal consultation be a cover for thuggery and theft.” Hazard, supra note 94, at 1091. 
So, the privilege does not apply, for example, when “the legal service was sought or 
obtained . . . to commit or plan to commit a crime or a tort.” Id. at 1063. The privilege also 
does not provide an automatic way for a party to withhold information from the court 
merely by revealing it to his lawyer. As the Upjohn Court put it: “The client cannot be 
compelled to answer the question, ‘What did you say or write to the attorney?’ but may not 
refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a 
statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.” Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 
396 (citations omitted). 
109 “Balancing ex post the importance of the information against client interests, even 
limited to criminal cases, introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege’s 
application. For just that reason, we have rejected use of a balancing test in defining the 
contours of the privilege.” Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409 (citations omitted). 
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stenographer. But the Wolfle Court upheld the privilege itself because 
marital confidences are “so essential to the preservation of the 
marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the 
administration of justice which the privilege entails.”110 The marital 
communications privilege “should be allowed only when it is plain 
that marital confidence cannot otherwise reasonably be preserved.”111 
In the 1951 Blau case, the Supreme Court ruled that the marital 
communications privilege protected a witness’s refusal to disclose his 
wife’s location to a grand jury, saying that the witness “obtained his 
knowledge of his wife's whereabouts by communication from her,” 
that “marital communications are presumptively confidential” and the 
witness’s “refusal to betray his wife's trust therefore was both 
understandable and lawful.”112 
In the 1981 Trammel case, the Supreme Court narrowed the 
prohibition against adverse spousal testimony and at the same time 
reaffirmed “the independent rule protecting confidential marital 
communications” whose purpose is “to protect information privately 
disclosed between husband and wife in the confidence of the marital 
relationship — once described by this Court as ‘the best solace of 
human existence.’”113 
In these decisions, the Court recognizes the social dimensions of 
the marital communication privilege. The damage to the institution of 
marriage would be substantial and lasting if spouses were required to 
reveal in court the contents of communications made to each other in 
confidence.114 
 
 
 
 
110 Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934). 
111 Id. at 17. 
112 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1951). 
113 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). 
114 The Wolfle Court also delineated some of the curious contours of the marital 
communication privilege, ruling “communications between husband and wife, voluntarily 
made in the presence of their children, old enough to comprehend them, or other members 
of the family within the intimacy of the family circle, are not privileged.” Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 
17. The rationale for protection one intimate relationship, but not the others is not clear. 
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2. Adverse Spousal Testimony 
The evolution of the prohibition against adverse spousal testimony 
from Hawkins v. United States115 to Trammel v. United States116 
illustrates the way in which law of witness privileges changes in social 
practices and reveals that the basis for a privilege is often an 
assessment of the risk of harm to a valuable social relationship.  
The spousal privilege against adverse testimony began as a spousal 
disqualification, where a wife could not testify either for or against her 
husband since she was essentially the same legal person as the 
husband and his evidence for or against himself was inadmissible. By 
the 1950s, with the change in the social role of women, this 
disqualification was narrowed to a privilege that allowed one spouse 
to testify for the other, but barred adverse testimony unless both 
parties consented.117 
In the 1958 Hawkins case, the Supreme Court rejected a 
modification of the two-party privilege that would allow one spouse to 
testify voluntarily against the other because “the law should not force 
or encourage testimony which might alienate husband and wife, or 
further inflame existing domestic differences."118  
In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Stewart noted that this 
privilege was widely viewed as a “sentimental relic” and adherence to 
it was worship of an outdated tradition. The Court should do “more 
than indulge in mere assumptions, perhaps naive assumptions, as to 
the importance of this ancient rule to the interests of domestic 
tranquility.”119  
In 1980, the Trammel Court accepted the voluntary adverse 
spousal testimony privilege arguing “investing the privilege in the 
witness-spouse . . . furthers the important public interest in marital 
harmony without unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement 
needs.”120 The Court found that the “ancient foundations” for the 
 
 
 
 
115 Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958). 
116 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46.  
117 Id. 
118 Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 79. 
119 Id. at 81 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart concurred in part because of the 
difficulty of determining when a spouse was testifying voluntarily. 
120 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53. 
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“sweeping” two-party consent privilege against adverse spousal 
testimony relating to the lesser social and legal status of women “have 
long since disappeared.” Moreover, the two-party consent privilege 
did not in fact further the public interest in preserving the integrity of 
the marital relationship, since “when one spouse is willing to testify 
against the other in a criminal proceeding . . . there is probably little in 
the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve.”121 
F. Reporter’s Privilege 
The legal arguments surrounding the reporter’s privilege also 
reflect our themes of the social importance of the practice to be 
protected, empirical assessment of the actual risk to that practice and 
a judgment that an uncertain privilege would not protect the practice.  
Common journalistic practice is to maintain source confidentiality 
when needed. However, in 1972, the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. 
Hayes ruled that reporters have no right under the First Amendment 
or the common law to refuse to disclose informant information in 
grand jury proceedings.122  
The reasoning in this case turns on the extent to which a privilege, 
absolute or qualified, is needed to protect the public interest in 
newsgathering. Society’s interest in the reporter-informer relationship 
is “not in the welfare of the informant per se, but rather in creating 
conditions in which information possessed by news sources can reach 
public attention.”123  
The Branzburg Court considered the argument that if reporters 
are legally required to reveal confidential news sources, then “the 
source so identified and other confidential sources of other reporters 
 
 
 
 
121 Id. at 52. 
122 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). However, reporter shield laws in effect in 
many states and under consideration at the federal level provide legal protection for this 
journalistic practice.   
123 Id. at 727 (citing Notes: Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a 
Confidential Relationship, 80 Yale L.J. 317, 343 (1970)). See also id. at 737-38 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]his protection does not exist for the purely private interests of the 
newsman or his informant, nor even, at bottom, for the First Amendment interests of 
either partner in the newsgathering relationship. Rather, it functions to insure nothing less 
than democratic decision-making through the free flow of information to the public.”). Bok 
makes a similar point: “And the help held to justify confidentiality about informants by 
police and journalists is not directed to individuals in need of relief at all, but rather to 
society by encouraging disclosures of abuses and crime.” BOK, supra note 91, at 119-24.  
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will be measurably deterred from furnishing publishable information, 
all to the detriment of the free flow of information protected by the 
First Amendment.”124 But it rejected this argument on factual 
grounds, holding that “nothing before us indicates that a large number 
or percentage of all confidential news sources would in any way be 
deterred . . . .” by the absence of a reporter’s privilege based on the 
First Amendment.125 
In contrast, the dissent from Justice Stewart argued that the 
confidentiality of the relationship with a source “. . . is essential to the 
creation and maintenance of a newsgathering relationship with 
informants . . . .”126 When grand juries can subpoena reporters to 
testify about their sources, these sources “become fearful of disclosing 
information” and the newsman “will cease to investigate and publish 
information about issues of public import . . .” Moreover, the ability to 
subpoena reporters will not increase the flow of information to the 
courts because informants will cease to reveal information to 
reporters and in the absence of any informant information to disclose 
“the newsman will . . . cease to be a useful grand jury witness.”127 
Justice Douglas agreed about the empirical effect of ending the 
privilege, arguing if a reporter “. . . can be summoned to testify in 
secret before a grand jury, his sources will dry up and the attempted 
exposure, the effort to enlighten the public, will be ended.”128 
The court had before it not only a blanket absolute privilege but 
also a qualified privilege that would permit compelled testimony only 
if certain conditions were fulfilled, including a “compelling need” for 
the testimony.129 The majority rejected this qualified privilege as too 
uncertain to provide reassurance to any reluctant informants, arguing, 
“If newsmen's confidential sources are as sensitive as they are claimed 
to be, the prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge determines 
 
 
 
 
124 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 680. 
125 Id. at 691. The Branzburg opinion also notes that lower courts had reached similar 
empirical conclusions in describing as “tenuous” and “indirect, theoretical, and uncertain" 
the argument that revealing this information to a grand jury would destroy the ability to 
gather news. Id. at 671, 674. 
126 Id. at 728. 
127 Id. at 746. 
128 Id. at 722. 
129 Id. at 742. 
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the situation justifies it is hardly a satisfactory solution to the 
problem.130 
G. Confidentiality of Medical Records  
Confidentiality rules for medical information are often justified on 
the basis of their utility in protecting certain social practices, namely 
the successful practice of medicine and the effective conduct of 
medical research. 
The confidentiality of doctor-patient relationship is needed to 
protect the willingness of patients to disclose information to doctors 
for treatment. People do not expect their doctor to share their medical 
condition casually with friends and acquaintances or to use it for their 
own personal advantage. This confidential relationship is privileged, 
allowing medical personnel to refuse to testify in court because “. . . 
the utmost confidence between doctors and patients was necessary to 
ensure correct diagnoses.”131 The medical confidence is not absolute, 
however. Doctors are required to report a range of illnesses to public 
health officials, including venereal disease and the use of illegal 
drugs.132  
The norm of medical confidentiality is as old as the Hippocratic 
Oath.133 But the common law in the United States did not protect 
medical confidentiality. Beginning with New York in 1828, however, 
the states passed witness privilege laws in an attempt to ensure that 
 
 
 
 
130 Id. at 702. The court cites a 1970 law review article arguing that an uncertain and 
unpredictable qualified privilege would have a “general deterrent effect” and would 
“undermine significantly the effectiveness” of the privilege. It concluded that for the 
purpose of effectively protecting informants “only an absolute privilege would suffice.” The 
court’s objection to the privilege is empirical – neither the absolute nor the qualified 
privilege is needed to protect informants, but it accepts the argument that if informants 
were deterred form sharing information with reporters because of the prospect of later 
revelation in court, a qualified privilege would not protect them. Federal legislation 
establishing a reporter’s privilege is also qualified holding that a reporter may refuse to 
testify unless a number of specific conditions apply. See, e.g., discussion of H.R. 985, THE 
FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION ACT OF 2009, H.R. RES. 111-61, at 8 (2015). 
131 GOLDFARB, supra note 81, at 87. 
132 BLOUSTEIN, supra note 53, at 134. 
133 The oath reads as follows: “What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or 
even outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must 
spread abroad, I will keep to myself, holding such things shameful to be spoken about.” See 
GOLDFARB, supra note 81, at 87. 
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people sought treatment for diseases, a rationale based more on public 
health than on the idea that medical information is intrinsically 
sensitive.134 
The traditional social norm of doctor-patient confidentiality is also 
protected by explicit regulation. The Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) established the medical Privacy Rule under 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) so as 
to “. . . make the use and exchange of protected health information 
relatively easy for health care purposes and more difficult for purposes 
other than health care.”135 The rule requires patient authorization for 
the use and exchange of health information unless it is for health care 
purposes or one of twelve specifically defined public benefit 
purposes.136 
The rationale for the rule was the need to provide doctors with 
accurate information in order for patients to receive medical care.137 
HHS noted the existence of substantial concern among patients about 
the possible misuse of their health information.138 The absence of a 
national privacy standard was adversely affecting the provision of 
health care. In one national survey, “. . . one-sixth of respondents 
 
 
 
 
134 These laws were aimed to “encourage people to seek medical care when needed, even for 
embarrassing or socially unacceptable diseases.” GOLDFARB, supra note 81, at 87. 
135 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,924 
(Nov. 3, 1999) (codified at 45 C.F.R. 164.512). 
136 Health care purposes are defined to include “treatment, payment and health care 
operations.” No patient authorization is needed for these purposes because these purposes 
are within the medical context or are operations essential for the functioning of the medical 
context. The public benefit purposes are that justify release of medical information without 
patient consent are: Required by Law, Public Health Activities, Victims of Abuse, Neglect 
or Domestic Violence, Health Oversight Activities, Judicial and Administrative 
Proceedings, Law Enforcement Purposes, Decedents Cadaveric Organ, Eye, or Tissue 
Donation, Research, Serious Threat to Health or Safety, Essential Government Functions, 
Workers’ Compensation. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SUMMARY OF THE 
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE (2003). 
137 “In order to receive accurate and reliable diagnosis and treatment, patients must 
provide health care professionals with accurate, detailed information about their personal 
health, behavior, and other aspects of their lives.” See Standards for Privacy of Individually 
Identifiable Information, supra note 135, at 59,919. 
138 HHS found that patients wanted “to know that their sensitive information will be 
protected not only during the course of their treatment but also in the future as that 
information is maintained and/or transmitted within and outside of the health care 
system.” Id. 
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indicated that they had taken some form of action to avoid the misuse 
of their information, including providing inaccurate information, 
frequently changing physicians, or avoiding care.”139 
Some have made the argument that medical confidentiality cannot 
be justified by the empirically false argument that without it people 
would avoid doctors.140 According to this way of thinking, people will 
generally seek medical care regardless of whether their medical 
information is kept confidential because without medical care they 
will not recover from diseases. But this all or nothing way of thinking 
about the problem is mistaken. In emergencies, people will rush to a 
doctor and will usually disclose all to the attending physicians without 
bothering to calculate how much of this disclosure might come back to 
hurt them. But it is a public health problem when one out of every six 
patients is taking evasive action in their interactions with the health 
care system in order to avoid the misuse of their information. Medical 
confidentiality is one way to respond to evidence of a substantial 
decline in the utilization of the health care system.  
The goal is the protection of public health and the confidentiality 
rules are based on the empirical assessment that without the rules 
public health would be impaired. The rule also modifies the extent of 
the confidentiality provided depending on the urgency of the 
competing public benefit. Thus, the rule generally permits disclosure 
of medical information for law enforcement purposes without patient 
consent.141 However, disclosure is not permitted to law enforcement 
when the medical information disclosed in counseling or therapy.142 
The reasoning behind the greater protection for information disclosed 
 
 
 
 
139 Id. at 59,920. 
140 See Goldfarb, supra note 81, at ch. 4, 87 “Wouldn't sick people still use their doctors 
even if there was no assurance of confidentiality?”. 
141 For instance, the rule permits the disclosure of health information when a health care 
official believes in good faith that the disclosure is “necessary for law enforcement 
authorities to identify or apprehend an individual . . . [b]ecause of a statement by an 
individual admitting participation in a violent crime that . . . may have caused serious 
physical harm to the victim.” See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable 
Information, supra note 135, at 59919. The needs of law enforcement trump patient 
confidentiality in this circumstance.  
142 Disclosure is not permitted to law enforcement when health care officials discover this 
information “[i]n the course of treatment to affect the propensity to commit the criminal 
conduct that is the basis for the disclosure . . . or counseling or therapy; or . . . [t]hrough a 
request by the individual to initiate or to be referred for the treatment, counseling, or 
therapy . . .” Id. 
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in counseling is that revelation of this information would discourage 
people from seeking counseling that might enable them to avoid 
dangerous or harmful conduct. 
H. Application to Contemporary Privacy Issues 
A number of recent privacy policy initiatives and regulations 
incorporate contextual analysis. The Federal Trade recommends that 
for practices inconsistent with the context of their interaction with 
consumers, companies should give consumers choice, but that 
companies do not need to provide choice before collecting and using 
consumers’ data for commonly accepted practices.143 The Obama 
Administration’s consumer privacy report recommended a consumer 
privacy bill of rights containing a principle called “Respect for 
Context” and stating, “Consumers have a right to expect that 
companies will collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are 
consistent with the context in which consumers provide the data.”144 
 The new European General Data Protection Regulation calls 
for consideration of the “context in which personal data have been 
collected” in determining whether further use of information is 
compatible with the purpose for which the data were originally 
collected.145 The Federal Communications Commission’s proposal for 
broadband privacy, calls for opt-out consent for marketing 
communications-related services, but opt-in consent for other uses 
because they think that this approach is “consistent with consumer 
expectations” and observes the regulatory best practice that 
“consumer choice turns on the extent to which the practice is 
consistent with the context of the transaction.”146  
Nevertheless, how contextual analysis is supposed to be 
incorporated into privacy policymaker is far from clear. Helen 
Nissenbaum thinks that the current use of contextual analysis for 
privacy policymaking is a misunderstanding that reduces the 
sociological concept of social norm and social context to the notion of 
 
 
 
 
143 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 36, 48. 
144 WHITE HOUSE, supra note 4, at 15.  
145 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 1(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, http://eur-
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a business environment or the use of a specific technology. In other 
words, it misses the social dimension of contextual analysis in favor of 
more familiar economic and technological assessments.147  
Our discussion in the last section of how witness privileges 
preserve social norms of confidentiality allows us to formulate a series 
of policy-relevant steps that can guide the use of contextual analysis 
for privacy policymakers. A checklist would include the following 
elements: 
? Identify the social context within which 
information is being used and what purposes the 
disclosure satisfies 
? Assess how the information is used or is being 
considered for use in other contexts. 
? Look for adverse consequences for data subjects or 
others resulting from this secondary use 
? Examine the feedback mechanisms that might be 
activated, that is, look for ways in which people in 
the original context might withhold information as 
a way to protect themselves from these adverse 
consequences. 
? Assess the extent to which these protective efforts 
will frustrate the purposes, goals and objectives of 
the original context. 
? Compare the gains and losses across contexts 
In the rest of this section, the notion of contextual harm is further 
defined and the notion is applied to the cases of genetic privacy, 
student privacy and online social networks.  
I. Contextual Harm  
We want to understand the way in which the lack of privacy norms 
can create a special kind of social harm that I call harm to a context. 
Consider the following passage from Posner:  
A in conversation with B disparages C. If C has a right 
to hear this conversation, A, in choosing the words he 
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uses to B, will have to consider the possible reactions of 
C. Conversation will be more costly because of the 
external effects, and the increased costs will result in 
less, and less effective communication. After people 
adjust to this new world of public conversation, even 
the C’s of the world will cease to derive much benefit in 
the way of greater information from conversational 
publicity, for people will be more guarded in their 
speech. The principal effect of publicity will be to make 
conversation more formal and communication less 
effective rather than to increase the knowledge of 
interested third parties.148 
Posner immediately applies this line of reasoning to the student 
right of access to academic letters of recommendation under Family 
Education Rights and Privacy Act.149 If a professor knows that a 
student is going to see his letter of recommendation, he will write it 
less candidly. If the recipient of the letter of recommendation knows 
that the student has not waived his right to see the letter, then he 
knows that the letter is less than candid, and discounts it. Students 
recognize this dynamic as well and so almost universally sign a waiver 
“because they know that the information value of a letter of 
recommendation to which the subject of the letter has access is much 
less than that of a private letter of recommendation.”150 
The feedback mechanism here is transparent and intuitive. People 
adjust their current behavior based on an assessment of what 
implications present conduct will have on their future prospects. 
Confidential letters of recommendation are more credible and 
effective than letters that they see. So the social situation stabilizes 
with confidentiality as the norm, even when a legal rule exists allowing 
it to be overridden.  
Contextual harm occurs through this type of feedback mechanism. 
When people know that information from one context will be used 
against them in another context, they will refuse to divulge this 
information to begin with. This lack of privacy is injurious to the social 
practices that are constitutive of the original context. 
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It is important to isolate the elements of contextual harm and to 
do so it is helpful to imagine a status quo in which a social norm limits 
the flow of information from one context to another. This status quo is 
then disrupted by a changed social norm, or a legal override of the old 
norm. But that is not the end of the story. Participants recognize the 
new reality and restrict their information sharing. This new normal 
results in less contextual disclosure and a consequent inability of 
people to engage successfully or completely in the social practice. This 
is the harm to the social practice created by lack of a privacy rule.  
Contextual harm results from a feedback mechanism that creates a 
new equilibrium after the shock of a disruptive change in privacy 
norms. The harm is measured by the difference in value between the 
new equilibrium that develops as a result of the change in privacy 
norms and the old equilibrium that obtained under the old privacy 
norm.  
What powers the feedback mechanism that induces the change 
from one pattern of information exchange to a new one? The basic 
driving force of the feedback mechanism is that people will, if they 
can, withhold information when they think that information is likely 
to be used against them. But by withholding this information people 
are withdrawing from engagement in a desirable social practice or 
engaging in it in a less than complete fashion. The individuals suffer 
from doing this, but more importantly, there is a social cost, since the 
social practice falls into disfavor or disuse and the social welfare 
generated by the practice is lost. 
To be clear harm to a context is not some irreducible harm that 
pertains to a thing called a “context.” It does not arise willy-nilly 
independent of the wills, purposes and intentions of individual people. 
Instead, contextual harm takes place when rational people guided by 
their own self-interest take steps to protect themselves, if they can, 
from harmful uses of information. Ultimately, harm to a context 
means that people will not engage in the relevant social practice in 
ways that would be socially beneficial. 
Contextual harm is not just harm to individuals. Clearly, there can 
be no social harm without individual harm. But some injuries are 
personal in the sense that the damage is restricted to the data subject. 
People can lose money; or find themselves inconvenienced or 
embarrassed or upset; they can lose jobs or insurance coverage or 
health care. Other damages are social in the sense that they adversely 
affect social relationships with people. Connections with lawyers, 
doctors and clergymen are social relationships; they exist only if 
people routinely play the social roles that are assigned to them within 
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these relationships. If they cease to exist as relationships, the loss is 
social, not simply individual.  
Contextual harm is not quite the same thing as Nissenbaum’s loss 
of contextual integrity. Nissenbaum defines contextual integrity as 
that which is preserved when informational norms are respected and 
that which is violated when informational norms are breached.151 
Contextual integrity just is the preservation of entrenched 
informational norms. Contextual harm, in contrast, is the decline in 
participation in a social practice because of a loss of contextual 
integrity.  
The difference can be significant. Contextual integrity could be lost 
when a new informational norm replaces an old one, but because 
people still participate fully in the social practice under the new norms 
the context itself is not harmed. 
Contextual harm can also be prospective. Some new uses of 
technology really do not present new social contexts. Online banking 
is still banking. Online shopping is still shopping. But sometimes a 
new socio-technical context arises because of the way technological 
possibilities are embodied in social practice. The arrangements of 
people, information flows, actors, and social roles are not simply 
technologically updated versions of old arrangements. 
New social contexts do not have established norms that 
regulate information flows. So it is hard to define contextual harm in 
terms of violations of embedded informational norms that harm social 
practices. Still, information flows can harm a new or emerging social 
context. This can happen when the social benefits that the new 
technology makes possible cannot be realized or realized to their 
fullest in the presence of an adverse information flow.  
J. Genetic Privacy 
Legislation to restrict certain uses of genetic information outside 
the medical and research context provides a good example of how law 
can intervene to protect an informational norm under erosion by new 
technology and new business practices. As more companies began to 
use genetic information in a range of business decisions, the need to 
bolster the confidentiality of this information became urgent. 
Genetic screening can detect susceptibility for certain disorders 
such as cancer, Alzheimer’s disease and diabetes. This information 
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could be used to treat people and to conduct important research on 
the causes and treatment of genetically related diseases. It could also 
be used to deny insurance or employment to people based upon 
genetic dispositions to fall victim to expensive or disabling diseases.  
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) 
addressed this use of genetic information outside the medical and 
research contexts. It prohibits U.S. health insurance companies and 
employers from discriminating on the basis of information derived 
from genetic tests.152 Under this 2008 law, health insurance 
companies cannot reduce coverage or increase prices based on 
information about an applicant’s genetic code. Employers cannot take 
adverse action against employees or potential employees based on 
genetic information. Nor can companies require that a person take a 
genetic test as a condition of obtaining health insurance or 
employment. 
Why prevent this use of information? It is presumably accurate 
and predictive of both insurance risk and job performance. So a casual 
cost benefit analysis might say what’s the harm? People who have 
genetic disorders should pay higher insurance and should not be 
eligible for certain jobs. Employers, insurers and individuals without 
genetic disorders will all benefit. On balance, society would be better 
off. 
One response is that this is unfair, a violation of dignity and 
human rights of the individual. Another response is allowing genetic 
discrimination gets the cost-benefit balance wrong – in fact, people 
would suffer more from this than companies would gain. The 
contextualist approach allows us to see a rationale for the law that is 
independent of these human rights and utilitarian concerns. This 
rationale is that genetic discrimination would cause damage to 
medical and research practice.  
If genetic information is generally available for business or other 
non-medical use, people will seek to protect themselves from these 
potential adverse effects of genetic testing and will do everything in 
their power to block the flow of this potentially harmful information. 
In particular, they will stay away from genetic testing. As the National 
Genome Research Institute put it: 
 
 
 
 
152 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881 (2008) (the law does not apply to the sale of life insurance, disability insurance and 
long-term care insurance).  
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Many Americans fear that participating in research or 
undergoing genetic testing will lead to them being 
discriminated against based on their genetics. Such 
fears may dissuade patients from volunteering to 
participate in the research necessary for the 
development of new tests, therapies and cures, or 
refusing genomics-based clinical tests.153 
This example brings out a contrast between the witness privilege 
cases and the use of genetic information. Court testimony that 
breaches confidentiality norms is usually public; the parties know that 
it takes place or that it is permitted under law. The harmful use of 
genetic information might be done in secret, without the data subject 
ever knowing about it. This brings up the question of disclosure 
requirements, which we address later in the Policy Considerations 
section. 
In the case of genetic information, there was substantial public 
concern about the possible use of genetic information for insurance 
and employment eligibility. Some of the actual use might have been 
done in secret, but there was sufficient public acknowledgement of the 
practice so that people took into account the risk of this use when they 
considered whether or not to share genetic information for medical or 
research purposes.  
GINA was designed to reassure people that it would be safe to 
reveal their genetic information. But the exceptions in the legislation 
work against this goal. The law does not apply to life, disability and 
long-term care insurance so that people who have a genetic 
predisposition to serious diseases might find themselves paying 
higher premiums or being denied coverage altogether for these 
insurance products. As a result, in 2014, 6 years after the passage of 
GINA, it is still the case that “many people are avoiding the tests” 
because of the possibility of these adverse consequences.154 
 
 
 
 
153, Genetic Discrimination, NAT’L GENOME RES. INST. (Jan. 21, 2017), 
https://www.genome.gov/10002077/ [https://perma.cc/8QJQ-2WY8]. 
154 Kira Peikoff, Fearing Punishment for Bad Genes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2014), 
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This example illustrates some of the theme we saw in our 
examination of witness privileges: the basis for the privacy rules is the 
protection of an important social practice, the key question is the 
assessment of the risk to the social practice, and the notion that an 
uncertain confidentiality protection is often little better than no 
protection at all.  
K. Student Privacy 
Thinking of privacy as an aspect of social structure clarifies some 
aspects of the current debates about student privacy. In particular, the 
notion of contextual harm can illuminate the basis for the social norm 
and legal requirements that limit the use of student data to 
educational purposes.155   
A widely shared and entrenched social norm is that information 
about students gathered as part of instructional activities should be 
used only for education. Students reveal information about their 
aptitudes, learning styles, learning performance and so on to their 
teachers in order to receive instruction. The educational records that 
preserve student – teacher interactions and assessments of learning 
should be used by teachers and school officials only for the purpose of 
fostering and improving student learning. It would be contrary to this 
informational norm for student information to be used for any other 
purpose, even a worthwhile one.  
Current law and education codes and practices validate this norm. 
Regulations promulgated under existing federal law “do not permit 
PII (personally identifying information) from education records to be 
disclosed for purposes unrelated to education.”156 An industry-backed 
student privacy pledge commits providers of educational services to 
refrain from the use or disclosure of student information for targeted 
                                                                                                                   
separate file for genetic test results so the information is not sent to insurers. A small 
percentage of internists acknowledge that they hide or disguise genetic information).  
155 See Mark MacCarthy, Student Privacy: Harm and Context, 21 INT’L REV. OF INFO. 
ETHICS 13-24 (2014) (for a longer discussion of these issues). 
156 Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 76 Fed. Reg. 75,608 (Dec. 2, 2011) (codified at 
34 C.F.R. § 99), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-12-02/pdf/2011-30683.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6T2R-F65A]. Further constraints on the use of student data without 
parental permission are imposed by the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act.  See FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, THE COPPA RULE (2013) 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/rules/rulemaking-regulatory-reform-
proceedings/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule [https://perma.cc/U8NB-HLBL]. 
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advertisements to students.157 The new student privacy law in 
California forbids companies that operate a site, service, or 
application that is used primarily for K–12 school purposes and that 
was designed and marketed for these purposes from using student 
information for targeted advertising.158 
A draft Federal student privacy bill also addresses the targeted 
advertising issue. Under this bill, operators of student educational 
services cannot use student information to engage in or permit 
targeted advertising.159 President Obama endorsed legislation 
incorporating this restriction of the use of student information to 
educational purposes. His Student Digital Privacy Act “would prevent 
companies from selling student data to third parties for purposes 
unrelated to the educational mission and from engaging in targeted 
advertising to students based on data collected in school.”160 
Existing and proposed student privacy laws foster and protect the 
informational norms that grew up spontaneously within the 
educational context. What is the basis for the informational norm that 
restricts the use of student information to educational purposes? 
Nissenbaum approaches this question through the lens of 
contextual integrity.161 Her focus is on the need to retain the autonomy 
of educational practice, to insulate the educational process from other 
social practices and allow it to set and accomplish its own goals, values 
and purposes independent of the goals values and purposes of other 
social practices. The sharing of student information from the school 
with prospective employers might adversely affect the school context, 
causing teachers and students to give greater weight to practical 
considerations and reducing intellectual experimentation and training 
for democratic citizenship.  
 
 
 
 
157 STUDENT PRIVACY PLEDGE, (2017), http://studentprivacypledge.org/?page_id=45 
[https://perma.cc/9AYU-AXY8] (the pledge was initially adopted in 2014 and now has 
well over 100 signatories). 
158 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §22584 (West 2016). 
159 See Student Digital Privacy and Parental Rights Act, H.R. 2092, 114th Cong. (2015).  
160 FACT SHEET: Safeguarding American Consumers & Families, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 12, 
2015) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/12/fact-sheet-safeguarding-
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Sharing information outside the classroom for unrelated purposes 
can also generate self-protective behavior. Consider, for instance, the 
new technologies that can provide for personalized learning and the 
identification of students at risk.162 Information generated through the 
analysis of detailed student information is useful to personalize 
learning and speed the mastery of diverse subject matters and it can 
also be useful to identify students at risk of failure so that they can 
receive special attention that will increase their chances of success. 
But the same information can also be used to assess the eligibility 
of students for an array of offices and benefits. Is a student a good 
insurance risk? Is he likely to be an attractive consumer of specific 
products or services? Will he or she need government services? Will 
he be able to do this job? To the extent that this student information is 
predictive of competence in these other areas, there will be a push to 
use it for these purposes. 
But using this kind student information for these non-educational 
purposes might undermine the trust that students and parents have in 
the integrity of the educational system. They will think that 
information made available to schools can now be used against them 
in jobs, insurance, credit and the availability of products and services. 
Many of them are likely to respond to this potential for harmful use of 
educational information by avoidance, hostility and withdrawal.  
Since the use of educational technology and assessments can be 
required as a condition of attending school, it might be possible to 
block self-protective behavior through the use of mandates. But this 
ignores the real possibilities of resistance that would also undermine 
the educational context. An educational context of hostile, angry and 
withdrawn parents and students convinced that their school is 
working against their interests is not optimal. 
These consideration, although powerful, do not end the discussion 
since the harm to the school context must be measured in some 
fashion against the gains to other contexts. It is not at all clear on what 
basis this comparison of gains and losses is to be accomplished. 
Nissenbaum recognizes the need to address this issue, but does not 
resolve it. For her, any balancing has to be done “against the 
backdrop” of educational values rather than “at large.”163 But when the 
values, purposes and ends of competing context are at stake it does no 
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good to conduct an inter-contextual evaluation in terms of the internal 
objectives of one of the contexts. 
L. Online Social Networks 
Nissenbaum’s application of her contextual theory of privacy to 
online social networks is a good place to begin to understand how the 
notion of contextual harm clarifies the issues regarding privacy in 
online social networks.   
She begins by thinking of the online world as an extension of the 
offline world. It is not a “. . . distinctive venue, sphere, place, or space 
defined by the technological infrastructures and protocols of the Net . . 
.”164 Rather “. . . online activity is deeply integrated into social life in 
general and is radically heterogeneous in ways that reflect the 
heterogeneity of offline experience.”165 In particular, online social 
networking sites do not “. . . define a newly emergent, sui generis 
social context with its own internal rules.” We cannot start from 
scratch and pretend that “there are no entrenched norms with which 
we need to contend.”166 
This leads to us to “look for the contours of familiar social 
activities and structures” so that “context-specific informational 
norms may be extended to corresponding online activities.”167 
Specifically, online social networks are just extensions of the offline 
context of friendship.168 So when online social network information is 
used in an employment context “. . . norms have been violated because 
recruiters and bosses have not respected transmission principles by 
scanning materials intended for friends . . .”169 Similarly, the sale of 
social network profiles violates the traditional norms of friendship.170  
 
 
 
 
164 Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 DAEDALUS, THE J. OF 
THE AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & SCIENCES 32, 38 (2011). 
165 Id. at 37. 
166 Nissenbaum, supra note 7, at 223. 
167 A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, supra note 164, at 39. 
168 Gordon Hull et al., Contextual Gaps: Privacy Issues on Facebook, 13 ETHICS & INFO. 
TECH. 33 (2011) (Nissenbaum’s view of Facebook is similar to the view summarized by Hull 
et al., as “the cognitive model users bring to Facebook is offline friendship”). 
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448 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 13:2 
 
 
Nissenbaum correctly asks, so what? Why should this violation of 
the traditional norms of friendship mean that these practices are 
“morally problematic?”171 Why not adjust to the new practices? 
Her unsatisfactory answer is that the new practices undermine the 
old contexts. How can one maintain a friendship, she seems to say, 
when the information one shares on Facebook can be passed on to an 
employer or sold to an information service provider?172 But this is not 
enough. Offline information exchanges can continue unimpeded, but 
people will need to adjust their expectations for online exchanges. 
Once online social network information is regularly used in novel 
ways, people will become accustomed to it and expect it. Norms for 
social networks will evolve.  
The notion of contextual harm can help here. As people become 
more familiar with how online social network information can be used 
against them, they will take steps to protect themselves. They will 
begin to assume that their Facebook information is part of their job 
application, their application for a loan or their attempt to get 
insurance. They will protect themselves by revealing only those 
aspects of their self that they think will pass the scrutiny of these 
eligibility tests.173  
This self-protective behavior reveals a more fundamental reason 
for thinking of these out-of context information-sharing practices as 
problematic. They will lead to far less use and benefit from the new 
context of online social networks than is made possible by the design 
features of the technology itself. The magnitude of this harm to the 
social context itself needs to be assessed in designing privacy rules for 
online social networks.  
The notion of contextual harm focuses our attention on the loss of 
these social benefits. The values, purposes, goals of social networks 
are still evolving, but these networks vastly expand the possibilities for 
expression and association. Online social networks allow for and 
encourage unprecedented new ways to engage with other people and 
to share thoughts, experiences, attitudes and beliefs. Sharing personal 
 
 
 
 
171 Id. at 227. 
172 Id. at 228. 
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information on social media satisfies primal personal needs and 
desires and has substantial social benefits as well.  
Disclosing social network information outside this context for 
eligibility decisions runs counter to these intrinsic expressive and 
associational purposes of online social networks. How much harm is 
done is an empirical question that should draw the attention of 
privacy regulators.  
Considering what informational norms are needed to protect and 
promote the context of online social networks does not mandate any 
specific policy solutions. It directs attention to problems. One 
approach might be to follow the example of a proposed German law 
that would have prevented the use of Facebook information for 
employment decisions.174 In contrast, the emerging policy approach in 
the United States is not to ban the use of social network information 
for out-of-context eligibility purposes, but to regulate its use for 
employment, insurance, and credit granting under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, which grants rights to data subjects and imposes 
responsibilities on those who use data for eligibility decisions.175 This 
is one way to try to balance the usefulness of social network 
information for out-of-context purposes with the expressive needs of 
the context itself. 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
It is now time to draw together some of the implications of the 
previous discussions for policymakers. We start with stating clearly 
the principle of contextual harm, which has been implicit in our 
discussion up to now, and contrasting it with related principles. 
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A. Principle of Prevention of Contextual Harm 
We can abstract from the specific cases we have been considering 
a principle of prevention of contextual harm that can guide 
policymakers as they consider privacy laws or regulations:  
Principle of Prevention of Contextual Harm: A privacy 
rule restricting the flow of information out of a social 
context should be considered whenever such a flow 
causes or is likely to cause significant contextual harm. 
As we have seen, such a principle is active in the witness privilege 
cases relating to lawyers, psychologists, religious counselors, and 
reporters, and the contexts that generate genetic information, medical 
information, social network exchanges, and student information. It 
provides a basis for saying that law should keep information within 
the social context where it was generated. It does not rely on 
individual rights to privacy or the avoidance of individual, 
personalized harm. The factual basis for this principle is that the out-
of-context observability of information generated in a context alters 
contextual behavior itself. The normative basis is that when this 
altered contextual behavior is for the worse, defeating the intrinsic 
values, purposes and aims of the context itself, law might need to 
protect the social benefits that derive from a properly functioning 
social context.  
The standard examples of contextual harm derive from an 
examination of established social practices, where stable traditional 
information norms have developed to ensure the confidentiality of 
communications within these practices. But contextual harm also 
extends to new socio-technical systems. Here expectations about 
information flows have not congealed into stable social norms and the 
analysis must be forward looking. The analysis must assess the 
potential advantages of new social practices inherent in the technical 
capabilities of new socio-technical systems and design informational 
norms that will foster these social practices.  
One model for forward-looking privacy analysis is the role of 
privacy in the early days of the new United States republic. Privacy 
rules contributed to the expressive possibilities of a new national mail 
system that could link geographically disparate communities into the 
emerging political community that would be democratically governed 
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despite its territorial extent.176 This new communication network, the 
national postal system, could function as an effective integrator of the 
new nation only if people felt comfortable sharing potentially sensitive 
information via mail. If they thought national censors or political 
opponents or business competitors would gain access to the 
information they put in letters, they would restrict their 
communications to what they thought safe for those audiences. In the 
late 1700s and early 1800s, there were no pre-existing social norms to 
rely on, because the technology was new, but the political benefits of a 
widely used national mail system could only be realized by imposing a 
legal rule of confidentiality.177 
B. Respect for Context 
A principle of respect for context has surfaced in recent privacy 
policy discussions in the United States. It is similar to, but not exactly 
the same, as the principle of prevention of contextual harm. 
In its 2012 report on consumer privacy the Obama Administration 
embraced such a principle: 
Respect for Context: Consumers have a right to expect 
that companies will collect, use, and disclose personal 
data in ways that are consistent with the context in 
which consumers provide the data.178 
The key idea is that some data practices are “consistent with the 
context.” The Administration’s draft consumer privacy bill of rights 
introduced in 2015 replaced this idea with the notion of “reasonable in 
light of context.” The draft bill requires companies to: 
. . . provide individuals with notice regarding personal 
data practices that are not reasonable in light of context 
at times and in a manner reasonably designed to enable 
individuals to decide whether to reduce their exposure 
to the associated privacy risk, as well as a mechanism 
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178 WHITE HOUSE, supra note 4, at 15. 
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for control that is reasonably designed to permit 
individuals to exercise choice to reduce such privacy 
risk.179 
Some information practices are “reasonable in light of context” 
and some are not. The term “reasonable” serves to ensure that the test 
is not the empirical and possibly idiosyncratic reactions of specific 
people but the widespread expectations created by social norms of 
information flow. The further use of data collected in one context and 
used in another is not “reasonable in light of context” when it is not 
permitted by the informational norms that govern the original 
context.  
The idea here is that when a use of information is expected in light 
of the context in which it was created, the need for legal privacy 
protections such as notice is reduced. However, legal privacy 
protections are needed when informational norms are breached.  
The Federal Trade Commission’s 2012 Report on Privacy also 
embodied this idea that consistency with context reduces the need for 
providing legal privacy protections such as choice: 
Companies do not need to provide choice before 
collecting and using consumer data for practices that 
are consistent with the context of the transaction or the 
company’s relationship with the consumer . . .180 
In its 2015 report on the Internet of Things, the FTC reiterates this 
contextual approach: 
. . . the idea of choices being keyed to context takes into 
account how the data will be used: if a use is consistent 
with the context of the interaction – in other words, it 
is an expected use – then a company need not offer a 
choice to the consumer. For uses that would be 
inconsistent with the context of the interaction (i.e., 
 
 
 
 
179 DEMOCRATIC MEDIA, ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF 
RIGHTS ACT OF 2015 9, 
https://www.democraticmedia.org/sites/default/files/field/public/2015/draft_consumer_
privacy_bill_of_rights_act.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8WU-RNGR]. 
180 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 15.  
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unexpected), companies should offer clear and 
conspicuous choices181 
In this way, the principle of respect for context reduces to the idea 
of protecting reasonable expectations of information flow and use, 
where “reasonable” means “appropriate in the light of the 
informational norms of the context in which the information is 
collected.”  
The principle of respect for context embodied in these policy 
statements and draft laws is different from the principle of contextual 
harm. The principle of respect for context uses existing informational 
norms as touchstones for greater or lesser legal privacy protection. For 
example, the principle would allow information flows without notice 
and choice when the information flows are in accord with traditional 
expectations of the context in which the information is collected and 
used. But it would require that new, unexpected uses of information 
be subjected to a notice and choice regime and other privacy 
protections. 
In contrast, the principle of contextual harm would look to 
evidence of withdrawal from the context or other behavior damaging 
to the goals, purposes and ends of a social practice as signs for the 
need for a legal restriction on information flow. Existing social norms 
would be prima facie guides to the likelihood of contextual harm, 
since the existence of a norm suggests it has a genuine social role, as 
in the examples we have considered throughout this paper.   
But violations of expected social norms are only a prima facie 
guide to a problem. Existing informational norms might be outmoded 
or represent mere adherence to tradition without any contemporary 
social function. They might be “sentimental relics” like the adverse 
spousal testimony privilege.182 In addition, opportunities provided by 
new socio-technical systems might justify unexpected information 
flows. Also, the affront to embedded social norms might not 
significant enough to undermine the context’s ends, values and 
purposes. 
 
 
 
 
181 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS, PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN A CONNECTED 
WORLD (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-
privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/96BR-GSCQ].  
182 Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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The following example shows how the FTC would apply its 
principle of respect for context in the case of a new Internet of Things 
application:  
 . . . suppose a consumer buys a smart oven from ABC 
Vending, which is connected to an ABC Vending app 
that allows the consumer to remotely turn the oven on 
to the setting, “Bake at 400 degrees for one hour.” If 
ABC Vending decides to use the consumer’s oven-usage 
information to improve the sensitivity of its 
temperature sensor or to recommend another of its 
products to the consumer, it need not offer the 
consumer a choice for these uses, which are consistent 
with its relationship with the consumer. On the other 
hand, if the oven manufacturer shares a consumer’s 
personal data with, for example, a data broker or an ad 
network, such sharing would be inconsistent with the 
context of the consumer’s relationship with the 
manufacturer, and the company should give the 
consumer a choice.183 
In contrast, using the principle of contextual harm as a lens to 
analyze this example might result in a different way of thinking about 
it. A focus on contextual harm would lead us to ask whether this 
further use would be so upsetting to consumers that they would resist 
providing ABC Vending with any information associated with the 
smart oven. It would also lead us to ask whether there are any 
purposes, ends and goals of the new socio-technical system that would 
fail to emerge if people adopted a watchful or cautious attitude toward 
sharing information. Such a focus might also question whether the 
issue should be treated as an opportunity to discuss which norms are 
appropriate, rather than leave it to the one-on-one choice negotiations 
between a company and each individual consumer. 
It is helpful to reformulate the Administration’s principle that 
privacy practices should be reasonable in light of the context in terms 
of the notion of harm to a social context. This reformulation would 
state that secondary uses of information are unreasonable when they 
cause significant harm to the social context in which information was 
 
 
 
 
183 INTERNET OF THINGS, PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 181, at 
40. 
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originally collected. This differs from the intended formulation in that 
it would make the touchstone the extent of actual harm to a social 
practice rather than whether the information use is consistent with 
entrenched expectations about use. 
C. Purpose Specification 
It is worthwhile to compare the principle of contextual harm with 
the familiar principle of purpose specification. According to this 
principle, personal data shall be “collected for specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes should not be further processed in a way 
incompatible with those purposes.”184 
But what is “incompatible?” The Article 29 Committee, updating 
the EU’s thinking on the issues of purpose limitation and secondary 
use in a 2013 Opinion, said further processing for a “different purpose 
does not necessarily mean that it is automatically incompatible . . . 
.”185 Nor does the principle require that the further use be for a 
compatible purpose. The principle imagines that between compatible 
and incompatible purposes there might be purposes that are neither, 
that are neutral, not really related to the original purposes but also not 
 
 
 
 
184 General Data Protection Regulation, 2016 O.J. (L. 119) 35. Article 6(1)(d) of the 1995 
Data Protection Directive contained a similar principle. See Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. 
(L. 281) 40. This principle is drawn from the 1981 Convention 108 for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data, which requires that when 
organizations engage in the “storage of data, carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical 
operations on those data, their alteration, erasure, retrieval or dissemination” the personal 
data shall be “stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way 
incompatible with those purposes.” E.T.S. No. 108. The OECD Guidelines on the protection 
of privacy also contained a purpose specification principle: “The purposes for which 
personal data are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection 
and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not 
incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of 
purpose.” OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data, OECD pt. 2(9), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransbord
erflowsofpersonaldata.htm [https://perma.cc/FN2K-MRK9]. Article 8 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires that personal data must be processed 
fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or 
some other legitimate basis laid down by law. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, supra note 13, at 393. 
185 EUROPEAN COMM’N, ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 03/2013 
ON PURPOSE LIMITATION 21 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PP64-73SF]. 
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clearly at variance from them. The principle allows further uses for 
these neutral purposes as well as for purposes that “fit closely with,” 
that are clearly and obviously in harmony with, the original purposes. 
The Article 29 Working Group says this “compatibility” test for 
further use includes in part an assessment of “the context in which the 
personal data have been collected and the reasonable expectations of the 
data subjects as to their further use.”186 An incompatible use is for “an 
unrelated purpose that would not be reasonably expected by the data 
subject.” An incompatible use is what “a reasonable data subject would 
assume . . . (is an) . . . entirely unrelated purpose . . . .” These concepts 
give a “strong indication” of use for an incompatible purpose. 187 
Compatibility can be restored by appropriate data protection 
measures even when the further use is for an unrelated purpose that a 
reasonable person would not expect in context. The Article 29 
Working Group adopts a position similar to principle of respect for 
context used in recent U.S. privacy statements and draft laws, noting 
that where reasonable expectations are not met “additional 
safeguards, for example, informed consent of the data subjects, may 
help ensure that the further processing meets the expectations of the 
data subjects at the time of further use.”188  
The reliance on contextual analysis for assessing further use of 
information has moved from guidance by data protection regulators to 
a requirement of the new General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR). The GDPR retains the standard that the further use should 
not be incompatible with the purpose for which the data were initially 
collected.189 But in making this determination the new data protection 
regulation says that data controllers must take into account context 
and consequences.190  
What is the connection between the principle of contextual harm 
and the principle of purpose specification? The principle of purpose 
 
 
 
 
186 Id. at 40. 
187 Id. at 56-57. 
188 Id. at 13, 63 (considering online marketing, the Article 29 Working Party says: “tracking 
and profiling for marketing purposes can usually only be considered as compatible use if 
there is a lawful basis for the processing such as genuine, unambiguous, freely given and 
informed consent”). 
189 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 5. 
190 Id. 
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specification would apply more broadly than the principle of 
contextual harm, blocking uses for incompatible purposes rather than 
just for those that caused contextual harm. Data uses that involve 
contextual harm are uses for incompatible purposes, that is, they go 
beyond the original reasons for providing the information and touch 
on new uses in different contexts. But the converse is not true. Some 
incompatible uses might cause no contextual harm.  
The principle of contextual harm might countenance further uses 
when embedded social norms have no contemporary social function, 
where opportunities provided by the new socio-technical system 
justify unexpected information flows, or where the affront to 
embedded social norms is not significant enough to motivate 
individuals to withdraw from the context in which they provided 
information or to otherwise alter their contextual behavior in ways 
that undermine the goals, purposes and values of the context. In these 
circumstances, the principle of purpose specification might provide 
for further privacy restrictions, while the principle of contextual harm 
might not. 
GDPR calls for the consideration of whether the use of 
information for a further purpose is compatible with the original 
purpose for which the information had been collected. It might be 
helpful to incorporate the notion of contextual harm into this 
consideration. This could be done by interpreting Article 6(4)(b)’s 
reference to the “context in which the personal data have been 
collected” as calling for an assessment of the extent to which the 
purposes, goals and values of the context of collection have been 
harmed by the further use.191   
D. Contextual Conflicts 
We have seen several areas where information derived from one 
context is useful in a different context. The principle of contextual 
harm suggests that a privacy restriction should be considered when 
the additional use in a different context feeds back to work against the 
values, purposes and ends of the original context. But the needs of the 
different contexts are in conflict: what violates the integrity of one 
context might further the values, purposes and aims of a different 
 
 
 
 
191 Id. (calling for consideration of “the context in which the personal data have been 
collected, in particular regarding the relationship between data subjects and the 
controller”). 
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context. In these cases of contextual conflict, it does no good to draw 
on the internal purposes and values of each context. We need a 
principle or set of principles that can help adjudicate conflicts between 
contextual needs.  
As we saw the case of witness privileges, genetic information, 
medical information, social networks and education, conflicts between 
contexts can be and are resolved. But it is hard to discern any 
principle at work other than intuitive case-by-case balancing.192  
One consideration that can guide our thinking in this area derives 
from the self-defeating nature of some of the proposals for re-use of 
information out of its original context. The proposals are self-
defeating because people react to the new regime of secondary, out-of-
context use by restricting the flow of information into the new context. 
In the case of witness privileges for confidential communications, we 
saw that without the privilege the communication dries up and there 
is no additional information available to the court. The privileged 
information would never come into existence without the privilege.  
In a similar way, any new proposal for out-of-context reuse of 
information might be self-defeating. Once people know about the new 
out-of-context reuse, and perceive it to be harmful or likely to be 
harmful to them, they react in a self-protective way to stop the 
communications that give rise to the harm. In the new equilibrium 
that results, there might be no new information for re-use because 
people do not disclose information anymore in the original context. 
In these cases, the benefits to data users arise from surprising 
people with a new out-of-context information flow. But the costs fall 
on the data subjects. Once the data subjects realize that the new 
information use is harmful to them, they stop sharing for the original 
purpose and the secondary use dries up as well. In the new 
equilibrium, there is a net loss to society. Any advantage to the new 
context will be temporary and short-lived, while the damage to the old 
context will be permanent and irrevocable. To the extent that this 
result seems to be likely and significant, to that extent there is a case 
for not allowing information flow out of the original context.  
 
 
 
 
192 Nissenbaum, supra note 7, at 239 (recognizing the issue, but not resolving it. 
Nissenbaum states conflicts may surface “between or among contexts themselves . . . in 
collisions between library and law enforcement contexts, between health care and 
commercial contexts, and between health care and kinship contexts.” Her proposed 
resolution is case-by-case: “I can think of no other way to deal with these except case-by-
case, optimistic that some of these conflicts will be neutralized within the contexts 
themselves, a challenge for the future”). 
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It is important to emphasize that this situation might call for 
norms backed by the law. The actors who might gain from the new use 
of information operate in one context; those who would lose operate 
in another. The gains to the winners do not matter to the losers; and 
the losses to those who suffer contextual harm do not matter to the 
winners. Marketers using student information to target ads to 
students could gain by even a temporary increase in the accuracy of 
their advertising, even if over time this would cause problems for 
education as schools, parents and students engage less and less with 
effective educational tools. The short-term gains fall on one party 
while the long-term losses affect others. 
The losses from contextual harm are also likely to be irreversible. 
Once people lose trust in the limitations of information use to the 
original context, it is difficult to persuade them to part with 
information going forward. The downside risks of harm to valuable 
social practices cannot be ignored or downplayed. We need to be 
sensitive, as Post suggested, to the “extreme fragility of privacy norms 
in modern life.”193 
Our examination of witness privileges revealed the dangers of 
leaving the resolution of contextual conflicts to a case-by-case 
balancing. If the privilege exists only as an individualized, after-the-
fact, and fact-based case-by-case determination, it might not be 
effective.194 An uncertain privilege is “little better than no privilege at 
all.”195 
A limitation on out-of-context use has to be adopted as a rule, not 
as a consideration to be taken into account on a case-by-case basis. If 
there are to be exceptions from such a limitation, as there might need 
to be to avoid the rigidities of absolutism, they should be clear and 
limited, with a view toward creating accurate expectations in the 
minds of the relationship participants. People should not need to 
consult lawyers to understand whether their information is protected 
in a certain context.  
 
 
 
 
193 Post, supra note 58, at 1010. 
194 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (noting “[m]aking the promise of 
confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative importance of 
the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate 
the effectiveness of the privilege”). 
195 Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U. S. 383, 393 (1981).  
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The lack of guiding principles in assessing cross-context data use 
will be increasingly problematic in the age of big data analytics. Big 
data analytics is a natural evolution of older data analytics 
methodologies. It involves new processing techniques for analyzing 
data of increased variety, velocity and volume. Big data sets often 
consist of unstructured data such as text, images or video, or semi-
structured data such as web logs. As a result, they require analytical 
techniques different from those typically used to analyze structured 
databases.  
Data for analytical purposes will increasingly come from several 
sources including traditional enterprise data, machine generated data, 
sensor data and social media data. Big data works best when it can 
combine, merge or link data from multiple sources and different 
contexts to see what new insights can be derived by looking at the data 
as a single picture of a complex social reality.  
But this is precisely where we need to be careful. In the age of big 
data analytics, machine learning and artificial intelligence, data 
increases in value in part because it has been separated from the 
original purpose of its collection.196 
It is important to emphasize that the data in this new big data 
world is decontextualized. The contextual source of the information is 
less important than whether it contributes to accurate predictions. 
Rather than create incentives for organizations to be sensitive to the 
context from which information is drawn, the merging and linking of 
data from a vast array of different contexts encourages the idea that 
the resulting portrait is independent of any social context. It is a 
contextless collection of information about a person that does not 
derive its validity or meaning from any specific social context and is 
available for use in any and all specific contexts.  
In this circumstance, there are few incentives to examine the 
feedback effects on the contexts from which the information is drawn 
to see if self-protective behavior undermines these contexts. For this 
 
 
 
 
196 See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A 
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013). “With big 
data, the sum is more valuable than its parts, and when we recombine the sums of multiple 
datasets together, that sum too is worth more than its individual ingredients.” Id. at 108. 
“The extra cost of collecting multiple streams or many more data points in each stream is 
often low. So, it makes sense to gather as much data as possible, as well as to make it 
extensible by considering potential secondary uses at the outset.” Id. at 109. “[. . .] [D]ata 
intermediaries will emerge that are able to collect data from multiple sources, aggregate it, 
and do innovative things with it.” Id. at 135. “[. . .] [D]ata is now raw material entering the 
marketplace; an asset independent of what it had previously aimed to measure.” Id. at 136. 
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reason, there is a need for a special effort to focus the attention of 
analysts, scholars, policymakers, and business executives on the 
possibilities of contextual harm from these feedback mechanisms.  
E. Completeness 
We have been exploring the way in which privacy rules operate to 
allow people to engage in important social activities. In the absence of 
these rules, people might take self-protective actions that would 
impede context-appropriate conduct, to the detriment of the larger 
society that relies on the functioning of these social practices.  
But what about areas where self-protective actions are difficult or 
impossible to take? Or circumstances where people do not know the 
extent to which information is shared out-of-context? Here people do 
not have the knowledge, capacity or ability to withdraw from the 
social activities, and so they continue to engage in context-appropriate 
behavior, regardless of the harmful consequences they will suffer as a 
result. There might be adverse consequences for individuals in 
continuing to participate in the social activities in question with no 
real capacity to withdraw.  
Policymakers might want to protect people from these adverse 
consequences, but cannot justify it on the basis of contextual harm, 
since, without self-protective actions, there is no harm to the context. 
What should be done when there seems to be a problem but the 
principle of prevention of harm to contexts is silent? 
The question raised is really whether the principle of contextual 
harm is meant to be complete, to provide a rationale for all privacy 
rules so that if a privacy rule does not protect against contextual harm 
its basis is suspect. 
The answer is that the principle of preventing contextual harm is 
not meant to explain or justify all privacy rules; not all privacy 
problems are based on contextual harm. When withdrawal from a 
social practice is difficult or impossible, and yet imposes substantial 
harms on individuals who continue in the practice, then a rationale for 
protective measures could still be constructed and could be related to 
contextual matters. Policymakers can often reason that the continued 
functioning of the social practice is socially desirable and law should 
not permit the imposition of unfair penalties on people for engaging in 
these socially worthwhile activities. But in these cases, the basis for 
the restriction cannot be harm to the context, but rather whatever 
makes the penalty unfair. If people continue to engage in the context, 
and yet the flow of information out of the context imposes harms that 
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we think need to be avoided through a restriction on the information 
flow, then the basis for the restriction cannot be harm to the 
originating context. It must be an independent normative rationale. 
Any such independent rationales can be drawn from the traditional 
human rights and utilitarian frameworks.  
Contextual harm might seem to be a thin basis for privacy rules, 
since one way to prevent contextual harm is to keep secret any out-of-
context harmful use of information. Without knowledge, there is no 
feedback mechanism and without the feedback mechanism there is no 
contextual harm. 
Secret out-of-context use of information against the interests of 
the data subject seems to be almost a paradigm case of a privacy 
invasion. A disclosure requirement or a notice and consent 
requirement might remedy this privacy invasion, but there is no basis 
in the notion of contextual harm to require it. 
This concern is not a practical one. It is usually not possible to 
keep harmful further use of information secret, at least when the 
further use is widespread and legal. As we saw in the case of genetic 
information, even the fact that the information could be used against 
people is often enough to prompt the feedback mechanisms that 
would enable people to take protective action that damages the 
context in which the information was collected.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Thinking of privacy as an element of social structure is a fruitful 
way to approach privacy policy. It extends the range of considerations 
that should be brought to bear when a new information practice 
arises. In addition to concerns about human rights and aggregate 
individual harm, it directs attention to the possibility that valuable 
social practices will be damaged from information flows.  
Our review of several versions of the idea that privacy is an 
element of social structure revealed a rich mode of analysis that has 
yet to be fully utilized. The discussion of the rationales for various 
witness protections make it clear that seeking to prevent contextual 
harm has been a familiar tactic in the justification of legal rules 
protecting the confidentiality of various relationships. Examining 
genetic privacy, online social network privacy and student privacy 
through the lens of contextual harm revealed aspects of these 
problems that might otherwise have been hard to detect. 
For the future, I recommend the incorporation of assessments of 
contextual harm into policy making. To that end, I compared a 
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principle of contextual harm with familiar principles of respect for 
context and purpose specification, showing what they had in common 
and where they differed. A crucial task, especially in light intrinsic 
drive of big data analytics to decontextualize data, is to examine 
principles that might enable us to make better assessments of cross-
context data use.  
